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Abstract
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of social networks in
the context of developing countries. It contains two chapters that take on different
aspects of social networks.
In the first chapter, I study a characteristic of social networks, network struc-
ture, which is the way in which households are connected in a social network. This
chapter looks at how social networks help facilitate cooperation among people in the
community, at least, in the context of contributing to public goods. Public goods in
this case refer to shared infrastructure in rural villages such as community buildings,
water wells, and roads. Provision and maintenance of these public goods relies on
contribution of people within the village, and therefore is essentially a problem of
voluntary collective action. I study whether the level of network connectedness of
a household (as measured by network centrality) affects its decisions to contribute
to public goods, using data from the Gambia. For an identification strategy, I use
an instrumental variable approach that exploits the arguably exogenous variation
in village ethnic composition, largely determined by historical accident. The find-
ings suggest that better-connected households contribute more to some public goods.
The network position effect is smaller when using a centrality measure that accounts
for indirectly connected households. This paper also offers networks as a potential
mechanism that explains the long-established relationship between ethnic diversity
and public goods.
iv
The second chapter (co-authored with Alessandro Tarozzi and Aprajit Mahajan)
looks on a different aspect of social networks. In this chapter, we describe evidence
of limited diffusion of bednet acquisition and usage from beneficiaries of an ITN dis-
tribution program in rural Orissa, India, to households that did not receive bednets
during the intervention. Identification of such network effects relies on the change in
ITN adoption among the beneficiaries of a program of bednet distribution that was
carried out in a randomly selected subset of 141 study villages. This field experiment
was designed to increase the adoption rate of insecticide-treated bed-nets to protect
against malaria. The program randomly assigned 141 sample villages into 3 experi-
mental arms a group in which some households received free distribution of bed-nets,
a group in which micro loans for bed-nets were made available, and finally a control
group with no intervention. In this paper, we focus on the impact of the intervention
on households who lived in these respective groups of villages but did not receive the
intervention. Our sample households include those that were exposed to the program
via interactions with treated households. Identification is possible by exploiting the
exogenous variation from the randomized controlled trials. We find that there is
a small positive association between the number of social connections with treated
households and their bed nets usage. On average, spillovers were limited. However,
we find that bednet usage (but not acquisition) was substantively and significantly
associated with some (but not all) measures of social links between non-beneficiaries
and beneficiaries. This provides evidence, although limited, of network effects in the
adoption of a health-related technology possibly due to diffusion of information and
peer imitation.
v
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1Network Structures and Public Goods Provision:
Evidence from Village Kinship Networks in the
Gambia
1.1 Introduction
The economic theory of public goods generally predicts that, when public good pro-
vision is private, the free-rider problem arises.1 Yet, we observe abundant informal
cooperation for voluntary public good provision, especially in the developing coun-
try setting. One theory suggests that social capital may help mitigate this market
failure through networks such as kinship connections.2 Additionally, one strand of
game theory literature has investigated how network structures and network posi-
tions influence public good contribution (see, for example, Ballester et al., 2006 and
Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007). Despite the rich theory literature, there is a lack
of causal empirical evidence that establishes the relationship between networks and
public goods. The current study aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigat-
1 I consider public goods that are relatively non-excludable such as roads and water wells that are
shared by everyone in a given village. Individuals have incentives to free-ride by under-reporting
their valuations and still gain benefits of public goods due to non-excludability.
2 For a comprehensive survey of the social capital literature, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005).
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ing whether networks actually play a role in facilitating cooperation and whether the
network position of an agent affects his contribution level.
In this paper, I provide rigorous empirical evidence that network position, as
measured by network centrality, does indeed affect household voluntary public good
contribution. I show that better-connected agents contribute more, using data from
rural villages in the Gambia. The empirical challenge of this estimation lies in the
endogeneity of the network formation process. An observed relationship between
network position and public good contribution could be spurious, because network
position is correlated with some other unobserved attributes. To establish this causal
relationship, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) method that makes use of ar-
guably exogenous variation in village ethnic composition to predict household net-
work position. More specifically, I instrument household network centrality with
the fraction of households in the village that belong to the same ethnic group as a
given household. In an ethnically diverse country, such as the Gambia, having more
households of the same ethnic group in the village serves as a proxy for having more
kinship connections, mainly because of the patrilineal culture. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that this variation is at the village-ethnicity level rather than the village-level as
in a more commonly used measure of ethnic fractionalization.
The validity of this IV hinges on the patterns of settlements being exogenous to
factors influencing public good contribution. For a given ethnic group, the fact that
group size is larger in some parts of the country than in others is, by a large ex-
tent, determined by historical accidents. To address the main concern for household
sorting into villages, I show that, within the same ethnic group, households with
small and large ethnic representation are similar across all observed socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics. Moreover, data from the Gambia census reveal
that village ethnic composition has been historically determined and remained sta-
ble across time. In light of the fact that there is no sorting based on a wide range
2
of observed variables, any remaining concern for the unobserved variables correlated
with public goods is likely to be minor in this case. Additionally, I employ an ex-
tensive set of control variables to reduce possible omitted variable bias. Given the
current set of evidence, the exogeneity assumption seems plausible at least in this
context. In terms of the exclusion restriction, the anthropological and historical liter-
ature documents that ethnic identity in the Gambia is not as salient in everyday life
decisions compared to other West African countries (no incidence of ethnic conflict,
no language barrier, and so on); therefore, ethnic composition should not influence
public good decisions directly.
To estimate the effect of network position on public good contribution, I use
a unique dataset from rural Gambia that contains information on complete village
kinship networks. These traditional rural societies have poor access to electricity
and reliable water sources. They rely heavily on community involvement to provide
and maintain public goods with some assistance from the governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Public goods considered in this paper include roads,
communal buildings, water wells, public education and public health; all of which
are shared at the village level.
My main results suggest that central households voluntarily contribute more.
When using degree centrality as a measure of household network position, I find that
the effect is slightly larger than that of eigenvector centrality, possibly indicating
that direct links are more important than indirect links in public good decisions
(see the appendix for formal definitions of network terminology). The estimates are
robust to controlling for various types of relationships outside the village and using
different subsamples that exclude extreme ethnic majorities and minorities. At the
village level, there is some evidence that denser networks sustain a higher level of
contribution, but the relationship is inconclusive. I interpret the results as evidence
that social capital in networks can be used to facilitate cooperation. There are sev-
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eral mechanisms that can explain this network centrality effect on cooperation such
as monitoring, social pressure, pure altruism, and information diffusion. However,
because of data limitations, I estimate the net effects of these mechanisms and do
not distinguish among them.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide field-based evidence outside
of a laboratory setting.3 It also offers an alternative interpretation to the long estab-
lished results that ethnic fragmentation lowers public goods, thereby adding to the
public good literature. The results provide suggestive evidence of social networks as
a mechanism causing this relationship. In this paper, the data allows me to break
down the analysis to the household level; this is useful because agents, even within
the same group, may face different levels of incentives to provide public goods. This
breakdown helps supplement the results in the literature that mostly use aggregate
public good data.
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature that estimates the
effects of social networks on economic outcomes, especially in the developing country
context. For example, many network studies have been particularly interested in
peer effects;4 however, only a few recent papers have taken network structure into
account when considering public goods contribution.5 In this work, I attempt to
estimate the causal effects of network positions on an outcome, a relationship that
has not been studied empirically using a non-experimental approach.
While my empirical strategy is specific to the unique context of the Gambia,
3 The findings resonate with the results of an experimental study by Carpenter et al. (2010) who
conduct a lab experiment to compare public good contribution under different network structures.
4 An agent behavior is influenced by his/her peers’ behavior. See, for examples, Conley and Udry
(2010), De Giorgi et al. (2009).
5 Jackson et al. (2012) examine favor exchange in networks and propose that a threat of losing
common links can be used to support a seemingly fragile one-shot game. They provide empirical
evidence that such structure of having multiple common links is prevalent in Indian village networks.
Alatas et al. (2012) and Banerjee et al. (2013) take a structural approach to model diffusion of
information also in the developing country context. Both find that central agents are better informed
and better able to contribute to the diffusion of information.
4
the findings yield broader policy implications for development projects that require
collective action within a community. Examples of such projects are the growing
Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs led by the World Bank. (Wong,
2012)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines potential mecha-
nisms and discusses theoretical works that establish links between network structures
and public good contribution. Section 3 describes data used in the paper. Section
4 explains the identification strategy and establishes the validity of the method.
Section 5 presents main findings and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Motivation
The motivation of this paper is largely based on theoretical works that have es-
tablished a connection between social networks and public goods. In this section,
I discuss possible mechanisms through which network positions may affect public
good contribution. I also review the game-theory literature that considers cooper-
ative games in the network setting. Although most existing models do not apply
directly to the current context, I discuss how some aspects might explain what can
be observed in the data. In terms of theoretical predictions, there is no consensus in
the literature on the relationship between individual network position and the equi-
librium level of contribution. Theoretical results generally depend on assumptions
made regarding the excludability of public goods and the nature of network links. An
empirical analysis in this paper therefore aims to provide some guidance for future
theoretical works.
In rural areas of developing countries, public goods often refer to infrastructure
such as roads, schools, and water wells that are sometimes non-excludable in the
community.6 Agents, or in this case, households, have access to public goods regard-
6 This is suggested in the focus group interviews discussed in Section 3.
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less of their contribution and network connections.7 In terms of network interactions,
there seems to be some strategic complementarities between the contributions of two
connected agents, since we observe a positive correlation between them. However,
the correlation, by itself, might reflect correlated unobserved heterogeniety because
of the underlying network formation process. The interpretation of such complemen-
tarity is further discussed below. In the absence of networks, the situation reverts
back to the classical public good model that results in free-riding of agents.
Among others, Belhaj et al. (2012) develop a model that can be applicable to the
current setting, in that they study a class of cooperative games in networks with lin-
ear best-reply functions.8 In this model, contributions between connected agents are
assumed to be strategic complements. Their theoretical results show that when net-
work effects are small, an agent’s equilibrium contribution is proportional to his/her
centrality. This simple prediction is appealing for an empirical test; however, the
proportionality depends on the size of a theoretical parameter and the overall shape
of network structures. When the network effect is large, this relationship breaks
down. The equilibrium solution may not exist without further assumption such as
imposing an upper bound on possible contribution. Moreover, if the interactions be-
tween actions of connected agents are strategic substitutes, instead of complements,
the equilibrium solution may involve complex multiple equilibria (Bramoulle´ et al.,
2013). Therefore, testing these models directly requires collecting more data as well
as assumptions that may not be reasonable nor testable.
Instead of viewing network relationships as strategic interactions, a different
7 A branch of theory literature focus on local public goods in which goods are non-excludable
only along a link but not to others. Working examples of such public goods are innovations and
information. The interactions between the contributions of two connected agents are often assumed
to be strategic substitutes. Relevant papers include Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), Bloch and
Zenginobuz (2007) and Galeotti and Goyal (2010).
8 An example of payoff function that might fit the current setting of global public good is a
modification of Equation (1) in Ballester et al. (2006) with an additional term to capture non-
excludability at the network level i.e. agents’ payoffs also depend on the total contribution.
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model by Wolitzky (2013) considers network connections as monitoring channels
(agents can observe only behaviors of those connected to them). Under this setup,
a group can sustain the maximum level of cooperation (contribution) using a grim
trigger strategy.9 The model also makes a similar prediction that central agents have
a higher level of cooperation. The equilibrium characterization relies on the fact
that an agent deviates from his maximum cooperation once he receives some infor-
mation of any deviation from his connected peers. The information about deviation
then diffuses along network links to other agents. Eventually, the entire cooperation
collapses after the deviation of at least one agent. In rural villages, however, pub-
lic good projects are generally village-wide activities. It is possible that a villager
can observe those without links present at an ongoing project regardless of network
structures. Therefore, kinship networks used in this paper may not be the best proxy
for a monitoring network for public goods.
As presented above, there is no consensus in the theory literature on how network
positions or, more specifically, network centrality, affect public good contribution.
Instead of directly testing any specific model, which would require making untestable
assumptions given the current dataset, I estimate the empirical relationship between
network centrality and household public good contribution. This exercise can help
shed light on the direction of the relationship and, indeed, whether such relationship
exists at all.
The theoretical basis in the above set of literature motivates me to choose eigen-
vector centrality among many network measures in the literature.10 While a simpler
measure, degree centrality, focuses only on the number of direct peers; eigenvector
centrality is designed to capture impacts from both directly and indirectly connected
9 Each agent plays the maximum level of cooperation, until he observes a deviation.
10 Eigenvector centrality corresponds to a special case of Bonacich centrality, the measure used in
Ballester et al. (2006) and Belhaj et al. (2012). See the appendix for further discussion.
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agents. It assigns centrality scores so that an agent’s score is a weighted sum of the
scores of his/her connected agents. Having a more central neighbor contributes more
to an agent’s score than having a less central neighbor. Another benefit with using
the eigenvector centrality is that the results can be compared with other empirical
studies that also use the same measure (for example, Banerjee et al., 2013, Alatas
et al., 2012).
In addition to the theory literature, a similar question has been studied only
in an experimental setting by Carpenter et al. (2010). In the experiment, subjects
were assigned into groups of four and asked to play repeated public good games. In
this context, the (exogenously imposed) network connections dictated who observed
whom in terms of contribution. The researchers found that agents contributed more
when being monitored more. Also, well-connected networks yielded a higher level of
contribution.
In a non-experimental setting, there are other possible mechanisms that can ex-
plain why network centrality might affect public good contribution. I outline three
possible mechanisms in addition to monitoring in this section.
First, central agents may face a higher threat of social punishment. They have
more to lose if they shirk. The idea of social punishment or social sanction has
been extensively explored in the public good literature; yet, it largely ignores social
networks as an implementing channel. For example, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) build
a simple public good model in which agents can punish free-riders of the same ethnic
group but not across ethnic groups. Therefore, a highly diverse community has a
lower contribution level because its members cannot impose punishment effectively.
However, such a relationship cannot explain a low level of public goods in places with
ethnic homogeneity (Esteban et al., 2012). On the contrary, these cases may be better
explained by network fragmentation, rather than ethnic fragmentation. Consider two
unconnected agents from the same ethnic group; if one free-rides, another would not
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have any credible means to assert social pressure. On the flip side, it is also possible
that two agents of different ethnicities may be connected and thus possess the means
to punish each other. This type of punishment is also observed in experimental
settings (see Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, Masclet et al., 2003, Ertana et al., 2009). In
some cases, findings indicate that experimental subjects choose to punish free-riders
even at their own costs.
Second, network centrality may serve as a proxy for the true valuation of pub-
lic goods if an individual valuation of public goods depends upon the number of
friends/families he has. A central agent has more to gain by contributing to public
goods because she cares about more people within a given network. This mechanism
is closely related to altruistic links among extended family studied in the previous
literature (Altonji et al., 1992, Cox and Fafchamps, 2008).
Third, the free-rider problem could stem from information asymmetry.11 When
the true valuation of public goods is private information, agents have incentives to
underreport their preferences, resulting in inefficient allocations. In the network
context, it is possible that the private information of central agents is better known
within their networks. There is some evidence in models of information diffusion
that more central agents are better informed (Banerjee et al., 2013, Alatas et al.,
2012). The opposite may be true that their private information might also spread
faster in the network.
Despite the rich theoretical literature, empirical studies that provide causal evi-
dence have been limited. The current study provides empirical evidence for the re-
lationship between network centrality and voluntary public good contribution. Due
to the limitations of the data, I estimate the net effects of the mechanisms outlined
above and do not distinguish between them.
11 This is studied in the literature related to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
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1.3 Data
1.3.1 Survey and Sampling method
I examine the effect of network positions on voluntary public good contribution using
cross-sectional data from the Gambia. The data is part of a baseline household sur-
vey for an impact evaluation of the Gambia Community-Driven Development Project
(CDDP) conducted between February and May 2009.12 To create a nationally rep-
resentative dataset, wards were randomly selected from 6 Local Government Areas
(LGA) out of 8 LGAs covering the entire country. Then, 3 - 8 rural villages were
randomly chosen from each selected ward. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics at
the village level. The villages are small with the number of households, ranging from
18 to 138. The economic conditions are those of traditional rural societies with little
access to electricity and improved water sources.
The data contain information on 2,718 households from 60 villages in rural ar-
eas.13 The aim of the survey was to cover a wide range of networks as extensively as
possible. This includes data on complete networks for various types of relationships
within the village. Using an ethnographical approach, the survey team covered 94%
of all households in the sampled villages.14
For the main analysis, I restrict the sample to a subset of villages referred to as
stable villages because my identifying assumption is more credible for this given sub-
set. The subsample includes 2,110 households in 48 villages.15 The details regarding
12 The data were generously shared with me by Dany Jaimovich of Goethe University Frankfurt,
Germany. Jaimovich (2011) and Jaimovich (2013) extensively analyze this dataset focusing on
network formation and substitutability between links within and across villages.
13 The network module in the survey is most complete with information of networks on 2,886
households as in Jaimovich (2011). The final sample is smaller due to some missing variables. Even
though I need to drop some households with missing data, they still count as a part of networks of
households in the final sample
14 This approach requires gathering household heads together to collect information. See Arcand
et al. (2010) for more detail on data description.
15 A stable village refers to a village in which ethnic group composition has been stable since 1993
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this restriction will be discussed in Section 4. The results for the full sample are
similar to the main analysis and are included as a robustness check.
In rural Gambia, villagers are usually organized into compounds in which mem-
bers of the same family, related by blood or marriage, live together in a group of
huts. Usually a compound can be identified as a household. In some cases, however,
some members of a compound declare themselves as an independent household (15%
of the sample household heads are not compound heads). The distinction between
a household and a compound is generally recognizable to the village head and other
villagers.
Table 1.2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for households in the sample.
The large average household size of 13 is explained by polygamous culture, with
48% of the households being polygamous. A head is generally the oldest male in
the household or his widow. A typical household may consist of multi-generational
nuclear families (van de Walle and Gaye, 2006). The average annual self-reported
per capita income was 2,282 Gambia Dalasi (approximately 302 PPP-adjusted US
Dollars per year or 0.8 US Dollars per day in 2008). This monetary income was
likely an inaccurate measure of standard of living of these households because of
agricultural activities and the informal sector.16 The preferred measures of wealth
are the number of huts with corrugated roofs and the number of huts with grass
roofs.
1.3.2 Public goods in rural Gambia
The setting of a traditional rural society makes the Gambia suitable for my interest
in network-level interactions. The cooperation of villagers in providing and main-
(the earliest census data available).
16 Since the majority of households (73%) worked in the agricultural sector, economic transactions
could be in-kind. Their actual consumption and standard of living may have been higher than
the self-reported monetary income. Unfortunately, we do not have information on consumption or
sources of income.
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taining public goods is prevalent, although there is some involvement of government
and NGOs. This dataset contains unique information on individual household con-
tribution that allows me to study household-level incentives to contribute to public
goods.
The questionnaire asked whether each household had any member who partic-
ipated in specific village activities for the community including roads, communal
buildings, water wells, public education, and public health. Even though the ques-
tion does not ask for specific tasks performed as a contribution, public goods contri-
bution in this case is defined broadly to include maintenance of the goods as well.
In addition, the survey specifies the form of each contribution (e.g. voluntary, paid
work, or monetary contribution). Approximately, 6% of all contributions were mon-
etary, less than 1% was work with pay, and the rest were voluntary work. In this
study, I focus on voluntary contribution including both monetary and in-kind work
and exclude paid work to isolate the incentives to contribute induced by networks
rather than monetary incentives.
Ideally, we would measure contribution in a more detailed manner, i.e. total
monetary amount or time spent contributing. However, the survey elicits only binary
variables for contribution to different categories of public goods. In addition to
these binary variables, I construct another outcome variable by summing the total
number of public goods to which a household contributes. Panel B of Table 1.2 shows
summary statistics of the six outcome variables. Note that only 3% of the sample
households reported not contributing at all. On average a household contributes to
3.1 public goods.
The pattern of contribution reveals that there is a high correlation for contribu-
tions among households in the same village. For each type of public goods, there are
some villages with zero contribution. Since the timing of the public good question
covered only one year prior to the survey, this pattern might indicate that contribu-
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tion also depends on projects occurring during the time period. This circumstance,
in turn, depends on needs that arise in the village. Since, the definition of public
good contribution is defined broadly, I assume that there is always an opportunity
for villagers to contribute to any type of public goods.17
In addition to the main questionnaire, the survey team conducted focus group
interviews among villagers in 29 villages (as reported in Arcand et al., 2010). The
participants were selected at random and invited to the interviews.18 Even though
we do not have specific information about existing public goods or the need for
certain public goods, this focus group report provides some insight into the public
good situation in the rural Gambia context. The report suggests that, in all 29 cases,
both male and female villagers (who composed separate interview groups) considered
access and distribution of public goods to be universal. Given this response, public
goods considered are likely to be non-excludable at the village level.
I next summarize some relevant aspects of each village public good as described in
the field report. First of all, water wells were noted as most inadequate in 27 out of 29
villages, followed by roads, public health, and public education. Villagers typically
shared one or two wells/boreholes with a hand pump. Based on the government
report on water resources (Jarju, 2009), these wells were hand-dug and not very
deep because of the shallow sand aquifer that received underground water from the
Gambia River. Given that every household needs water and that water wells are
typically the main source of clean water, they are a good representative of public
goods that require voluntary contribution. The second most important public good
is the availability of roads. Having good roads is related to having improved access
17 I also experiment with conditioning on whether a public good project exists by excluding villages
with zero contribution for each type of public goods. Doing so does not significantly change the
main results.
18 In practice, this was not always the case because some villagers passing by might have joined in
as well.
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to hospitals, markets, and other facilities outside of the village. This access is crucial
to monetary income because the rural Gambia economy relies heavily on groundnut
exports (Sylla, 2010). In the Gambia, there are two main all-weather roads that
stretch from East to West along the north and the south banks of the Gambia river.
Smaller roads that branch out into villages are generally dirt roads that can be
easily damaged during the monsoon season. The baseline report also suggests that
some villages were not accessible by roads all year round. Contributions to roads
may include activities such as building a new dirt road and repairing damages from
flood and rain. Another type of public good is communal buildings, such as town
halls. A mosque is also considered a community building; therefore, incentives to
contribute might vary with religion. This motivates me to control for religion in all
specifications. Note that 99% of the sample population is Muslim.
Public education and public health refer to the construction and maintenance of
related facilities such as schools and village health facilities. A specific example, as
told by a village chief during an interview: an NGO recently started a primary school
project by supplying construction materials, the villagers then had to cooperate and
organize their own manual labor for the construction. There could also be other types
of contributing tasks that require certain skills such as teaching or medical training.
More educated individuals may be more able to contribute to public education.
For this particular example, however, since the majority of the sample is illiterate,
contribution to public education may not necessarily mean formal teaching. For
instance, Gamble (1949) documents the use of folklore as a way to transfer knowledge.
Given this type of education, one does not require literacy to be able to contribute
to public education.
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1.3.3 Network Data
The network module contains binary data on kinship ties among all households
within a village. All relationships considered here are undirected and unweighted.19
The type of relationships considered here is kin networks, a term that refer to the
blood relations of a household head and his wives.20 The questionnaire asked which
households the household head and wives had direct blood relationships with (fa-
ther/children, direct brother/sisters).
Figure 1.1 illustrates network graphs that represent kin relationships among
households in 2 villages in the sample. Each node represents a household and each
line presents a kin relationship between the two connected households. The colors
of the nodes show whether the household contributes to a particular type of public
good (as labeled in the figure).
Two different measures of network centrality are selected based on the theoretical
motivation as discussed in Section 2. Each of which measure intends to capture the
relative importance of a node in a graph under different concepts. The simplest
measure of centrality, “degree centrality,” is the number of links a household has.
This measure, however, does not take into account other aspects of the network
beyond the locality of a given agent. It is possible that being connected to an
influential agent may make one more influential relative to being connected to a
non-influential agent. “Eigenvector centrality” captures this aspect by weighting
in the centrality of each connected node. This measure allows households with the
same degree centrality to vary depending on their extended networks. The correlation
19 An undirected link means that household i and household j are connected even if only one of them
reports the relationship. An unweighted link refers to a binary relationship with no information on
the strength of the tie.
20 The data also contains information on networks of economic-interactions among households. I
focus mainly on the kinship networks for which my identification strategy is strongest. The results
for economic-exchange networks are also included in the Online Appendix.
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between the two measures is approximately 0.6.21 Eigenvector centrality differs more
from degree centrality when there are many low-degree nodes (households with fewer
links) connecting to high-degree nodes. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of degree
centrality and eigenvector centrality.
Additionally, at the village level, I present a descriptive analysis of how aggregate
public good contribution (the percentage of households contributing to public goods)
may vary with a network structure measure. I use network density, which represents
how well connected households are within a village relative to all possible connections.
The descriptive statistics for all network characteristics are reported in Table 1.3.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
1.4.1 Identification
In estimating the effects of network position on public good contribution, the main
concern is the endogeneity of network positions.22 Households choose with whom to
form links. The direction of the bias in OLS estimates is ambiguous depending on the
underlying network formation process. Furthermore, there may also be other omitted
variables. For example, a previous study by Anderson et al. (2004) identifies trust
as a determinant reducing individual public good contribution. If more trustworthy
households are also more central, omitting a trust measure may therefore bias the
OLS estimates downward. Another determinant of public good contribution that
may also create a downward bias is the number of females in the households. Nowell
and Tinkler (1994) find that females generally contribute more to public goods. In
a male-dominant society, having more females in a household might be associated
with being less central in kinship networks. On the other hand, the direction could
21 This is significantly lower than the correlation found in Valente et al. (2008) who consider 62
health-related networks from 7 different studies.
22 See Manski (1993a) for a discussion of endogenous network formation.
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be the reverse, if we consider a potential reverse causality that contributing more
would attract more connections. Since none of these factors is particularly dominant
in this context and the network formation process is unobserved, the direction of
bias is left as an empirical question.
To address the endogeneity of network centrality, I exploit household ethnic frac-
tion within a village as an instrument for household network centrality. This variable
is defined as the fraction of households within the village that belong to the same
ethnic group as the current household. The ethnicity of a household is the ethnicity
of the household head which is pre-determined by that of his father. For illustration
purposes, in a village of 10 households, if 3 households belong to the same ethnic
group, their associated value of the household ethnic fraction is 0.3.
Since a kin link is more likely to form between households of the same ethnic group
due to the patrilineal culture, household ethnic fraction should be a strong predictor
of household network centrality. Note that since kin networks are defined as the
blood relatives of both husband and wives, it is not necessary that two connected
households must be of the same ethnic group. In fact, about 17% of all kin links
are between households from different ethnic groups due to inter-ethnic marriages. I
use the fact that rural Gambian villages are highly ethnically diverse, and that this
variation is arguably exogenous to estimate the effects of household network position
on public good contribution.
The validity of this IV method rests on the village-level patterns of settlements
being exogenous to the factors that influence household public good contribution
decisions. The identification is derived from comparing households of the same eth-
nicity who reside in places with variation in ethnic fraction. The main concern is
household sorting that leads to selection of different household types into villages
where they have less or more ethnic representation. I provide evidence against this
concern by showing that, within ethnicity, household observable characteristics are
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uncorrelated with household ethnic fraction. The key identifying assumption is that,
for a given ethnic group, group size (as measured by ethnic fraction) is bigger in
some parts of the country than in others, and this variation is, to a large extent,
determined by historical accident. Evidence supporting this exogeneity is discussed
extensively in the next subsection.
The exogenous treatment of ethnic composition has been used in the previous
literature. Prominent papers, including Easterly and Levine (1997) and Acemoglu
et al. (2001), treat ethnic fragmentation at the cross-country level as exogenous
when studying it as a determinant of economic growth. Among those who attempt
to tackle the endogeneity of local ethnic composition, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) use
residential ethnic composition to instrument for school-level composition in Kenya.
In the current context, I make an argument similar to that in the Kenya case: that
residential ethnic composition at the village-level has been historically determined
and that contemporaneous migration is limited.
Figure 1.3 displays a reduced-form relationship between household ethnic fraction
and household total public good contributions.23 I hypothesize that this positive rela-
tionship develops through the effect of household ethnic fraction on household social
networks and subsequently through social networks on public good contribution. To
allow for non-linearity, I also present a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing
estimate in the same figure. Overall, the nonparametric estimate is similar to the
linear estimate, although the ethnic fraction effect increases slightly between 0.4 and
0.5 but tapers off at 0.7.
In the rest of this section, I provide some background detail on ethnic groups
in the Gambia. Then, I provide evidence to support the exogeneity of the instru-
ment. Finally, for the exclusion restriction, I discuss the possibility of mechanisms
other than networks through which household ethnic fraction may affect public good
23 Full reduced-form results with all 6 outcome variables are included in the Online Appendix.
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contribution.
1.4.2 Validity of the IV
Despite the country’s small size, Gambian population comprises many diverse ethnic
groups. Major ethnic groups include Mandinka, Fula, Wollof, Jola, Serahuleh, Serer,
and Manjago. In this data, the average village ethnic diversity index (Herfindahl)
is 0.3.24 Historically, these ethnic groups migrated to Gambia from various parts of
West Africa, with Serer being the oldest inhabitants in the area. The dominant group
is Mandinka, who migrated to the Gambia during the spread of the Mali Empire in
the 13th century. The Wolof is generally located in the Western part of the Gambia
River. An extensive study series by anthropologist David Gamble (1949) explicitly
states how the Wolof occupy roughly the same area now that it did in the 15th
century. Even the newest ethnic group, Serahuli, arrived from the larger Senegambia
area since the 1800’s (Mwakikagile, 2010). Across all villages in the sample, those
that are closer to the capital, Banjul, generally have higher ethnic diversity, possibly
due to external migration to the economically developed urban areas. Also, among
different the ethnic groups, six different ethnicities form the village majority group
at least once in this data.
The census data, collected by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBoS), reveals
that ethnic composition at the national level has barely changed since 1983, indicat-
ing that settlement patterns have been historically stable or that the change has been
extremely gradual. Between 1983 and 2003, the largest group, Mandinka, remained
at approximately 34-36 % of the total population; the second largest group, Fula,
made up 17% with an increase to 22% in 2003.25 Note that the dataset oversampled
Mandinka and undersampled Wolof and Jola.
24 According to Fearon (2003), Gambia’s ethnic fractionalization index is 0.76 and is ranked the
26th most diverse country in the world.
25 More detailed data are provided in the Appendix.
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In order for household ethnic fraction to be a valid instrument, I argue that
households from the same ethnic group settle in places with variation in their ethnic
fraction by random historical accident. This claim is supported by the data. The
main concern is that there may be a selection process that leads to different types
of households sorting into villages related to public goods. In the context of rural
Gambia, sorting in this way seems to be limited. To investigate whether this type
of sorting is relevant in this setting, I compare households from the same ethnic
group with different ethnic fractions across all observed characteristics. The balance
check in Table 1.4 shows that they are similar across the categories of total income,
income from agricultural activities, household size, age of household head, whether
head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of household
workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village
chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee member,
role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, number of corrugated
huts and number of grass-roof huts. Of all variables, only one (having an imam in
the household) is significantly correlated with household ethnic fraction.26 Such an
occurence is likely to be random. The results reinforce the argument that ethnic
fraction of households within the same ethnic group is random and likely to be
determined by historical accident.
In all specifications in this paper, I also control for this extensive list of variables
to correct for any potential imbalance. The remaining concern that may invalidate
the instrument is household sorting based on unobserved characteristics correlated
with pubic good contribution. Based on the current results and further information
from the census data, this concern seems to be minor in this case.
One implicit assumption that I make in the analysis is that only networks of
26 Excluding households with imams (approximately 20 households) does not change the main
results.
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households within the same village matter for public good decisions. For kinship
networks, the ethnic fraction variable serves as a proxy for extended families residing
in the same village. Households with a smaller ethnic fraction could have a large
kinship network living outside of the village; however, since public goods are shared
at the village level, networks outside the village should not affect their within-village
public good decisions.
A further investigation using the 1993 and 2003 census data shows that the ethnic
fraction variable has been stable in the sample villages over the ten-year span. Recall
that the full sample contains data from 60 villages. I could confirm the stability of
this variable in only 48 villages and therefore restrict my main analysis sample as
such. At the village level, the absolute percentage change of each ethnic group has
an average close to zero for all groups. 8 out of 60 villages have one or two groups
with a relatively large percent change.27 Most of these unstable villages are located
closer to the Banjul areas, especially in the upper and lower Niumi districts across
the river from the capital. In particular, one unstable village that lies on the West
coast near Banjul experiences a drastic fall in the “Others” ethnic category. Another
unstable village has a 275% increase in population size. This change is not true in
the stable villages. As a robustness check, I perform an analysis on the full sample
as well.
Note that the changes in the census data are at the population level rather than at
the household level as used to construct the IV. To some extent, these changes could
reflect household expansion rather than creation of new households (which would
not affect the ethnic fraction variable). Unfortunately, the number of households in
each village is reported at an aggregate level that combines several nearby villages
into a 500-household “census settlement.” Villages forming each settlement also vary
between the two census rounds, making it difficult to determine whether the observed
27 Data on 4 villages were not available in the 1993 census.
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population changes are due to migration or household expansion.
Additional data from the 2003 and 2009 migration reports address the concern
about migration in response to public goods. Mobility in rural Gambia is gener-
ally low. The 2003 Migration Analysis reports that 96% of internal migration in
the Gambia is rural to urban migration. The common destinations are the urban
Kanifing and Banjul areas, which are not included in the sample. The 2009 Mi-
gration and Urbanization survey suggests that the main reasons for migrating are
marriages and work (36.4% and 19.8% respectively). The majority of migrants are
either women who marry men who live the Banjul area or young men who move to
find employment in the city. Given that an average household size is large, this type
of migration may change household structure but has minimal impact on household
ethnic fraction in rural villages. As discussed earlier, the household-level census data
is not available to test this hypothesis; however, in interviews with 2 village chiefs
(in 2 rural villages outside the sample), the chiefs did not recall any situation where
a migration involved an entire household.
Additionally, ethnic composition may affect public good contribution via channels
other than networks. It has been established that ethnic fragmentation lowers public
goods in the previous literature, although only a few studies distinguish between
mechanisms explaining such a relationship. Habyarimana et al. (2007) attempts to
do so using a lab experiment in Uganda, finding find strong evidence in favor of
mechanisms that go through networks. I next discuss and provide evidence to rule
out channels other than networks in the current context.
First of all, one of the most studied mechanisms suggests that conflicts or dis-
crimination between ethnic groups can be the main cause of lower public goods. It is
well documented in the historical and anthropological literature that ethnic groups
in the Gambia live together harmoniously relative to other West African countries
such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, or Mauritania (Sonko-Godwin, 2003, Mwakikagile,
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2010). There is low to no tribal conflict. Despite different origins, the colonization of
the British, the abolition of slave-trade, and intermarriages between different ethnic
groups have promoted cultural integration among the ethnic groups. There is also
evidence against economic tension between ethnic groups. Arcand and Jaimovich
(2012) use the same data as does the current study to show that the difference in
ethnicity does not hinder households from engaging in an economic interaction. The
impact of ethnic diversity on public goods through direct conflict seems irrelevant in
this case.
Another possible channel is that minority households may have less access to
public goods and hence may not contribute. Even though I cannot directly test this
in the data, according to the focus group interviews, all groups in the 29 interview
villages report that access to public goods is universal. Moreover, even if the distri-
bution of public goods is dictated by a village authority figure, such as the village
chief and village development committee, being a village chief is not correlated with
being from a large or small ethnic group, as evident in the balance check in Table
1.4.
Households of the same ethnic group may possess technology that enhances coop-
eration among them. An example of such technology is language. People of different
tribes may have a language barrier in cooperating for public goods. However, this
is not the case in the Gambia. In general, a large fraction of population - including
children - speaks more than one language, especially Mandinka. More importantly,
individuals can speak the language of the dominant tribe in their own villages. For-
mal schooling is conducted in English. Another type of technology that may enhance
collective actions is social sanction (see, for example, Besley and Coate, 1995 and
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). This requires an assumption that households can only
sanction those in the same ethnic group. It is more credible to specify a precise
channel, such as network links, as a way households can punish one another.
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Last but not least, another explanation suggests that households may simply
have altruistic feelings strictly toward others in their own ethnic group. If true,
we should see that, at the village level, higher ethnic fragmentation reduces the
aggregate level of public goods because households feel less altruistic towards others
in the village. Panel A of Table 1.5 shows that when the village-level contribution
is regressed on ethnic fragmentation index (Herfindahl index), the coefficients are
not significant for all types of public goods. The coefficients are small with large
variances. The same results hold when controlling for network density in Panel B.
Moreover, the coefficients for network density are much larger than the coefficients
for ethnic fragmentation index. In addition to the village-level evidence, there are
also other reasons to believe that this channel is a minor concern. In the context of
the Gambia, ethnic identity is not salient in everyday life decisions as manifested in
the lack of ethnic conflict incidence, the lack of language barrier, and so on. The
spread of Islam throughout the region reconciles differences among people and seems
to create an identity that is more unifying than ethnic identity (Mwakikagile, 2010).
Despite indirect evidence, altruism strictly toward co-ethnic households remains
a potential limitation for the exclusion restriction of the IV. Overall, since channels
other than networks do not seem relevant in this context, the exclusion restriction
of the IV, household ethnic fraction, is plausible.
1.4.3 Empirical specification
For the household-level analysis, I estimate the effects of household network position
on public good contribution using a 2SLS regression. The first-stage specification is
as follows:
Centralityijk “ α0 ` α1EthFractionijk ` α2Xijk ` ETHj ` vk ` uijk
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where the IV, EthFractionijk, is the fraction of households in the village k that
belongs to the same ethnic group j as household i, Centralityijk refers to the two
measures of household network centrality (degree centrality and eigenvector central-
ity), Xijk is a vector of household characteristics, ETHj are ethnicity fixed effects, vk
are village fixed effects, and finally uijk is the error term for the first stage regression.
Table 1.6 presents the first stage regression results. The coefficient, α1, is highly
significant. Household ethnic fraction works well in predicting kin network central-
ity.28 The F-stats are 61.03 for degree centrality and 94.45 for eigenvector centrality,
well above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 16.38.
The second stage is then:
Contributeijk “ β0 ` β1 {Centralityijk ` β2Xijk ` ETHj ` vk ` ijk
where Contributeijk is the outcome variable (5 binary variables for different types
of public goods and 1 non-binary variable, total contribution), {Centralityijk is the
predicted network centrality from the first stage, and ijk is the error term in the
second stage regression.
The main coefficient of interest is β1, which represents the effect of network
centrality on household public good contribution. The outcome variables are binary
(with an exception of total contribution), so β1 can be interpreted as a probability.
29
In all but the first set of the OLS estimates, I control for a range of household
characteristics (see the list in Table 1.4). Because my analysis is at the household
level, household size and the number of household workers might be problematic:
having more members and workers both relaxes the household resource constraint
to contribute to public goods and increases the channel of connections to other
28 The first stage regressions are similar to a specification in Table 8 of Arcand and Jaimovich
(2012).
29 Probit model yields similar results in comparisons to the linear probability model. The probit
results are available upon request.
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households. Controlling for these variables is crucial. However, the effect of having
an additional household member on network centrality may not be constant for all
levels of household size. To identify networks separately from the ethnic composition
of the village, I experiment with a more flexible form of the household size variable by
using household size relative to the rest of the village (ranking) instead. I also control
for village fixed effects, because we do not have information regarding either existing
public goods in each village or their specific needs for public goods. This control also
sweeps out common factors such as availability of projects and government/NGO
involvements in providing public goods. Since the sample villages are relatively
small, it is reasonable to assume that all households face the same public goods
within the village.
1.5 Effects of Network Centrality on Public Good Contribution
1.5.1 Descriptive Results
I begin by presenting the descriptive results.30 Following the theoretical motivation
laid out above, I consider two different measures of centrality: degree centrality and
eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality counts only the directly connected house-
holds, whereas, eigenvector centrality captures a broader network structure beyond
the given household’s locality. Table 1.7 shows how the two centrality measures vary
with observed characteristics. Both measures are correlated with several variables,
indicating that network formation is likely to be a non-random process.
Next, I analyze how network density is associated with aggregate public good
contribution at the village level. Intuitively, a denser network has higher social capital
that could better facilitate cooperation, leading in turn to higher levels of public good
contribution. Some of the frameworks in the theory literature discussed in Section
30 In all analyses, I drop households that report unusually large degree centrality. The cutoff is at
15 which is approximately the 99 percentile. There are only 20 households above this cutoff. Using
the full sample does not change the results by much. The results are available upon request.
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2 also extend to predict network-level contributions. The outcome variables are
percentages of households in the village that contribute to different types of public
goods.
Panel B of Table 1.5 shows that a denser network is associated with more con-
tributions for roads, public health, public education, and average total contribution.
The relationships are statistically significant for all of above but public education.
The results are reversed for contribution to communal buildings and water wells. Sur-
prisingly, for these two types of public goods, sparser networks are associated with
more contributions. This set of results, however, cannot be interpreted causally,
because the results may be driven by omitted variable bias. For example, a high
network density may capture the fact that households live relatively closer together
(despite the same level of village area) and therefore need fewer contributions to
water wells. More data is needed to disentangle the effect of network density on
aggregate contribution. Nonetheless, this descriptive result helps to bridge the main
results at the household level to community-level public goods, for which data are
generally more available in other contexts. The village-level evidence also allows for
comparisons with the previous literature that studies public goods at the aggregate
level (for example, Alesina et al., 1999, Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).
Before proceeding to the IV results, I establish correlations between network
centrality and voluntary household contribution to public goods. Panel A of Table
1.8 reports the OLS estimates when regressing the six contribution variables on the
two network centrality measures. Each outcome variable is regressed separately on
each centrality measure. Overall, both centrality measures are positively correlated
with public good contribution. More specifically, we see significant and positive
correlations for contribution to community buildings, water wells, public education,
and total contribution. It is worth emphasizing that the two centrality measures are
of different scales.
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Panel B of Table 1.8 reports similar specifications while holding a range of house-
hold characteristics constant. The coefficients do not change by much, even though
the centrality measures are correlated with some of the control variables. The co-
efficients of both centrality measures for total contribution become slightly smaller
and less precise. Some of the household characteristics are significantly correlated
with contribution, but there is no obvious pattern across public goods.31 Farmers
are more likely to contribute to roads. More education is associated with contribut-
ing to community building construction. Households with fewer members and more
workers are more likely to contribute to water wells. Households with traditional
healers also contribute more to water wells as well as public health. Households with
marabouts, on the contrary, contribute less to public health. Those in the village
development committee contribute more to public education. Finally, the village
development committee and farming households contribute to more types of public
goods overall.
1.5.2 IV Results
In Table 1.9, the IV results suggest that network centrality increases household con-
tribution to public goods. The coefficients are positive for all types of public goods,
but they are significant only for water wells and total contribution. In all cases, the
IV estimates are at least twice as large as the OLS estimates. The downward bias
indicates that such factors as a reverse causality from public good contribution to
centrality may not be as dominant.
The effect of degree centrality is particularly strong for water wells. The marginal
effect of having an additional kin link increases the likelihood to contribute by 3%.
The difference between an isolated household and a household with an average num-
31 I only present the coefficients of network centrality but omit estimates for household character-
istics.
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ber of links, 4, is 11%; the size of the effect accounts for 25% of the mean water well
contribution. The effect is as large as 75% for a household with the highest degree
centrality (15 links). For total contribution, the network centrality effect is small
compared with the mean outcome.
The eigenvector centrality measure diverges from degree centrality by taking into
account indirectly connected households. Eigenvector centrality also allows house-
holds with the same degree centrality to vary depending on the extended network
structure surrounding them. This measure can be interpreted as a weighted sum of
walks originated from a given household to other indirectly connected households.32
A longer walk (between the originated house and an indirectly connected household)
is discounted more. Thus, a household is more eigenvector-central, if it is connected
to more households with shorter distances.33 The distribution of this measure, as
shown in the Figure 1.2, has a fatter tail above the mean (0.79) compared to the
distribution of degree centrality, with a large number of households clustered close to
0. The shape of the distribution indicates that when the global network structure is
taken into account, the difference between the mean and the most central households
is wider than is the difference when one focuses on the local network using degree
centrality.
Since the value of eigenvector centrality is relative, it is more meaningful to inter-
pret the magnitudes of the coefficients by direct comparisons. Increasing household
eigenvector centrality from 0 to the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles raises the
likelihood of contributing to water wells to 3%, 8%, 15%, and 41%, respectively.
Notice that the increment is much larger at the higher percentile because of the
distribution shape. For comparison purposes, the same calculation for the degree
centrality estimates yields 6%, 11%, 17%, and 39%. Overall, the magnitudes of
32 A walk is a sequence of links connecting a sequence of nodes (households).
33 See the terminology appendix for further explanation.
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the eigenvector centrality coefficients are slightly smaller than those of the degree
centrality, possibly suggesting that direct links are more important to public good
decisions.
Despite positive effects for water wells and total contribution, the lack of coef-
ficient significance of other types of public goods does not imply that there is no
relationship; it may be a result of the lack of statistical power. When the sample
is expanded to the full sample, at least two other coefficients become significant
(community buildings and public education). Yet, the centrality effects for roads
and public health seem especially low. In this context, road construction and public
health may rely more on public provision from the government than from household
cooperation. The field report suggests that, from the perspective of villagers, roads
as a public good generally refer to roads that connect one village to another, as
opposed to those used within a village. In this case, contributing to roads may be
less feasible for a private provision project to undertake and may require coopera-
tion across villages. Similarly, public health may also be difficult for within-village
provision, because providing public health may need constant outside support from
professionals with formal healthcare training.
1.5.3 Robustness checks
The validity of the IV results in Table 1.9 depends on the exogeneity of the IV.
As argued above, the assumption seems plausible, at least in the current setting. I
further confirm the results by performing three robustness checks. Overall, I find
that the main IV estimates are robust with small changes in magnitude.
First, I add another set of controls, including network relationships outside the
village and enumerator fixed effects. In addition to the within-village networks,
the dataset contains information on the existence of links with households outside
the village. The information is, however, limited to binary variables - whether the
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household has different types of relationships outside of the village rather than the
actual number of such external links. These variables were previously excluded for
parsimony. The types of external links include having a credit exchange (borrowing
or lending), a labor exchange, a land exchange, a productive input exchange, and
lastly marriage relationships. Furthermore, I also attempt to control for measurement
errors that may arise from data collection by controlling for enumerator fixed effects.
During the survey, respondents were in interviewed in groups. One concern is that the
respondents might be influenced by the enumerator and other respondents present
during the same interview.
Panel A of Table 1.10 reports the IV results for this robustness check. Compared
with the main results, the estimates do not change by much when more controls are
added. Most coefficients increase slightly, but do not differ significantly from the
previous estimates. Only in a few cases are the enumerator fixed effects significant,
indicating possible but limited measurement errors from interviewing in groups.
As a second robustness check in Panel B, I use the full sample to ensure that
the results are not driven by the selection of the stable village subsample. When
the full sample is used, the results show a similar pattern to the main analysis with
only stable villages. The magnitudes are slightly larger. The coefficients of network
centrality become significant for communal buildings and public education.
Panel C of the same table presents the results for another subsample that excludes
extreme cases of households with the largest and smallest ethnic fraction. These
extreme ends of the ethnic fraction distribution may capture preferences that are
not representative of the data. Again, the IV estimates do not change much from
the main results.
Taken together, the results show that better-connected households contribute
more to various public goods and also contribute overall. The positive effects are
robust to several robustness checks.
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1.5.4 Alternative specifications
This subsection considers alternative specifications to the main results.
Non-linear relationships
It is possible that there is a nonlinear relationship between contribution and network
centrality. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) found an inverse-U relationship between the
number of social links and the decision to adopt a new crop because of the learning
effects and strategic delays. In the current context, the influence from each link may
decline with additional links. It could also be that households with a very large
network can assert influence on their links and do not contribute. I explore two
different specifications that allow for non-linearity. Since there is only one IV for
network centrality, the identification strategy cannot be applied to the non-linear
specifications.34 Investigating the possibilities for non-linear relationships using OLS
estimates can still help interpret the main results.
I first formulate a nonlinear specification by adding a squared term of degree cen-
trality to the OLS specification (in Panel B of Table 1.8). Table 1.11 shows that the
coefficients for squared terms are negative, albeit small and statistically insignificant,
for most public goods. The next specification (Table 1.12) allows for more flexibility
by using a set of dummy variables for each level of degree centrality. There is some
evidence suggesting nonlinear relationship. In particular, for water well contribution,
having more than five links seems to have a stronger positive correlation. I test the
non-linear models against the linear specifications using the likelihood ratio test. The
results show that the two models are not statistically different. Overall, however,
there is limited evidence to suggest non-linear relationships between centrality and
public good contribution.
34 One possibility is to use a squared term of household ethnic fraction as an additional instrument
for a squared term of centrality. However, the first-stage F statistics do not pass the weak instrument
test.
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Peer effects framework
Within the existing literature, a number of studies have explored impacts of social
networks under a peer effects framework which posits that an agent’s behavior is
influenced by peer behaviors. My paper focuses on the effect of network position
(measured by centrality) rather than peer effects. For comparison purposes, I also
report the results using a peer effects specification. I regress household public good
contribution on the number of connected households that contribute, controlling for
the total number of connections (degree centrality).
Contributei “ α0 ` α1 ř
j‰i
gijContributej ` α2 ř
j‰i
gij ` α3Xi ` ei
where gij “ 1 if household i is connected to household j; gij “ 0, otherwise. α1
is the effect of having an additional link who contributes.
Table 1.13 shows that, in most cases, a household decision to contribute is posi-
tively correlated with its peers’ behaviors, indicating possible strategic complemen-
tarities assumed in some of the models discussed in Section 2. The coefficients are
significant only for roads and community buildings. Holding the total number of
peers constant, an additional peer who contributes is associated with a 1% increase
in likelihood to contribute to roads. The estimates however could be resulted from
correlated unobserved factors such as preferences for public goods. In that case, the
positive sign indicates that households with similar preferences are more likely to be
connected. Identifying the peer effects is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper employs social network analysis from the sociology literature to analyze
economic decisions. I provide field-based evidence for the relationship between net-
work position and household public good decisions, a relationship that has mostly
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been studied in the theory literature and the experimental setting. The results estab-
lish network centrality as a determinant increasing public good contribution. Given
the limitations of the current data, I do not distinguish between the mechanisms driv-
ing this relationship. A natural next step would be to understand these distinctions
better. Additionally, the descriptive results at the village level suggest a possibility
that sparse networks may constitute a channel that causes the negative relationship
between ethnic diversity and public goods. This observation can potentially explain
some of the puzzling results in Esteban et al. (2012), in which countries such as
China, Haiti, and undivided Korea experienced many cooperative problems despite
low ethnic fragmentation. Future works can investigate these particular cases for ev-
idence regarding their network structures. The findings also yield policy implications
that exploiting information about existing social networks may be beneficial when
implementing community-driven projects. For example, policy makers can target
their effort to communities with more households with low centrality, because it is
more difficult to sustain cooperation.
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1.7 Figures
(a) Village ID: 4, contribution to water well construction
(b) Village ID: 11, contribution to public health
Figure 1.1: Examples of kin network graphs (black dot = contribute)
Notes: This figure presents network graphs of kin networks for two villages in the sample. Each
node represents a household in the village and a line represents a kin relationship between the two
connected households. The black color means the household contributes to the public good.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of centrality measures for kin networks
36
Figure 1.3: Reduced-form relationship between number of household contributions
and household ethnic fraction
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics at the village level
Variables Mean S.D.
A: Village characteristics
# of households 54.31 28.10
Total population 599.08 210.95
Village area (km2q 122651.40 127730.90
Log per capital income 14.74 0.58
Income Gini coefficient 0.30 0.10
Illiteracy rate 0.42 0.21
% Population without electricity 0.97 0.04
% Population without toilet 0.37 0.30
Ethnic diversity, Herfindahl index 0.31 0.21
Religion diversity, Herfindahl index 0.03 0.08
B: Outcome variables
% contributing to road construction 0.56 0.29
% contributing to community building construction 0.60 0.33
% contributing to water well construction 0.45 0.27
% contributing to public health 0.58 0.31
% contributing to public education 0.36 0.30
Avarage total contribution 2.71 0.98
Number of observations 48
38
Table 1.2: Summary statistics at the household level
Variable Mean S.D.
A: Household Characteristics
Income (Gambian Dalasi, 28GD = 1USD in 2008) 29213.18 20506.27
Household size 12.80 8.79
Head age 51.97 16.15
Female head 0.06 0.23
Whether household head is illiterate 0.46 0.50
# Current sick members 0.24 0.49
# Household workers 4.55 3.72
Amount of lands owned (hectares) 8.29 20.50
Self-reported high quality land 0.05 0.21
Marital status1: unmarried 0.03 0.17
Marital status2: monogamous 0.46 0.50
Marital status3: polygamous 0.48 0.50
Farming 0.73 0.44
Muslim 0.99 0.09
Number of corrugated huts 1.31 1.37
Number of grass-roof huts 1.09 1.55
Self-report relative wealth 1 (first quantile) 0.45 0.50
Self-report relative wealth 2 (second quantile) 0.25 0.48
Self-report relative wealth 3 (third quantile) 0.16 0.36
Self-report relative wealth 4 (highest quantile) 0.04 0.20
Role: Alkalo (village chief) 0.02 0.14
Role: Village development committee 0.19 0.40
Role: Traditional healer 0.13 0.34
Role: Imam 0.02 0.13
Role: Marabout 0.02 0.14
Ethnicity 1: Mandinka 0.53 0.50
Ethnicity 2: Fula 0.22 0.41
Ethnicity 3: Wollof 0.10 0.30
Ethnicity 4: Jola 0.09 0.29
Ethnicity 5: Sarehuleh 0.01 0.08
Ethnicity 6: Sereer 0.04 0.20
Ethnicity 7: Manjago 0.01 0.09
Ethnicity 8: Others 0.01 0.08
B: Outcome Variables
Contribute to public goods (Y/N) 0.97 0.16
Buliding road 0.62 0.49
Building community buildings 0.71 0.46
Public education 0.51 0.50
Public health 0.67 0.47
Public water source 0.44 0.50
Total contribution 3.10 1.34
Number of Observations: 2,112
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Table 1.3: Household network centrality and village network structure
Variables Mean S.D.
A: Village-level network characteristics
Kin network, density 0.13 0.08
Number of Observations: 60
B: Household-level network characteristics
Kin network, degree centrality 4.16 3.03
Kin network, eigenvector centrality 0.79 0.71
C: External link (binary)
External marriage link 0.85 0.36
External land-exchange link 0.16 0.37
External labor-exchange link 0.08 0.27
External input-exchange link 0.11 0.32
External credit-exchange link 0.15 0.36
Number of Observations: 2,112
Notes: All networks are undirected and unweighted.
Eigenvector centrality is normalized within a village.
See Appendix A for formal definitions of network ter-
minology.
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Table 1.4: Comparing households of the same ethnic group with variation in ethnic
fraction
(1) (2)
Coeff. Std. Errors
Log income -0.224 (0.925)
Household size 0.038 (0.086)
Head age -0.042 (0.035)
Female head -0.395 (1.990)
Illiterate head 1.484 (1.344)
# Sick members -0.693 (0.798)
# household workers 0.066 (0.148)
Land owned (hectares) 0.021 (0.018)
Self-reported high-quality land 0.693 (1.417)
Role: Alkalo 1.762 (1.497)
Role: Village dev. committee 1.700 (1.180)
Role: Traditional healer 0.364 (1.204)
Role: Imam 4.060** (1.630)
Role: Marabout 2.383 (1.630)
Farming 1.079 (1.195)
Muslim 1.917 (3.526)
Marital status1: unmarried 2.171 (3.431)
Marital status2: monogamous 0.318 (2.937)
Marital status3: polygamous 0.339 (2.789)
Relative wealth 2: second quantile 1.009 (1.024)
Relative wealth 3: third quantile 0.372 (1.174)
Relative wealth 4: highest quantile -1.975 (1.812)
Agricultural income -0.022 (0.101)
Number of corrugated huts 0.640 (0.419)
Number of grass-roof huts -0.709 (0.484)
Observations 2,110
Notes: This table shows that, within the same ethnicity, house-
holds from majority groups and minority groups are comparable
in all but one characteristic. Robust standard errors clustered at
the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 1.6: First stage regressions
(1) (2)
Endogenous Variable: Degree cent. Eigen. Cent.
IV:
Household ethnic group size 3.955*** 0.874***
(0.506) (0.090)
Constant -1.260 -0.196
(1.537) (0.501)
First-stage F statistic 61.03 94.45
Observations 2,110
R-squared 0.388 0.172
# villages 48
Notes: This table shows the first stage regression using
household ethnic group size to instrument for network cen-
trality. The critical value for the F-statistics is 16.38 (Stock
and Yogo (2005)). The coefficients of household character-
istics are not reported here, but are available upon request.
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are re-
ported in parentheses. The specification includes ethnic-
group FE, village FE and the following control variables:
log income, household size, age of household head, whether
head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household mem-
bers, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land
is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a tradi-
tional healer, role as a village development committee, role
as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, rela-
tive wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts
and number of grass-roof huts. *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, *
pă0.1.
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Table 1.7: Correlates of centrality measures
Degree cent. Eigen. cent.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. Std. Errors Coeff. Std. Errors
Log income -0.158 (0.135) -0.038 (0.052)
Household size 0.024* (0.013) 0.007** (0.003)
Head age 0.017*** (0.004) 0.003*** (0.001)
Female head -1.039*** (0.303) -0.084 (0.099)
Illiterate head -0.045 (0.148) -0.006 (0.039)
# Sick members -0.037 (0.142) -0.067* (0.034)
# household workers 0.032 (0.024) 0.004 (0.006)
Land owned (hectares) 0.012** (0.005) 0.002*** (0.001)
Self-reported high-quality land 0.816** (0.311) 0.089 (0.091)
Role: Alkalo 1.796*** (0.495) 0.389*** (0.107)
Role: Village dev. committee 0.735*** (0.181) 0.156*** (0.044)
Role: Traditional healer -0.192 (0.191) -0.089 (0.055)
Role: Imam 0.332 (0.415) -0.046 (0.111)
Role: Marabout 0.581 (0.382) 0.091 (0.095)
Farming 0.266* (0.153) 0.115** (0.044)
Muslim 0.152 (0.689) 0.159 (0.141)
Marital status1: unmarried 0.324 (0.471) 0.101 (0.135)
Marital status2: monogamous 0.340 (0.400) 0.083 (0.105)
Marital status3: polygamous 0.620 (0.378) 0.154 (0.098)
Relative wealth 2: second quantile -0.067 (0.149) 0.005 (0.046)
Relative wealth 3: third quantile -0.206 (0.205) -0.022 (0.063)
Relative wealth 4: highest quantile 0.227 (0.474) 0.273** (0.128)
Agricultural income 0.012*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001)
Number of corrugated huts 0.489*** (0.081) 0.098*** (0.019)
Number of grass-roof huts 0.016 (0.056) -0.009 (0.020)
Observations 2,110 2,110
Notes: This table show correlations of the two network centrality measures with household
characteristics. The high correlations with some variables indicate that network centrality
is likely endogenously determined. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are
reported in parentheses.
** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 1.8: OLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome variable Road Commu. Water well Public Public Total
construc. buildings construc. health educ. contrib.
Panel A: Correlations between network centrality and public good contribution
Obs. = 2,205
Degree -0.000 0.006* 0.015*** -0.000 0.014*** 0.020*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011)
Eigenvector Cent. 0.013 0.022* 0.060*** -0.014 0.073*** 0.079*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.044)
Household char. no no no no no no
Panel B: OLS controlling for household characteristics
Obs. = 2,110
Degree -0.002 0.003 0.012** -0.000 0.009* 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011)
Eigenvector Cent. 0.011 0.009 0.053*** -0.017 0.062*** 0.048
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.049)
Household char. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mean of outcome 0.61 0.71 0.5 0.67 0.44 3.1
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates from regressing public good contribution on household
network centrality. Each cell presents the main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All
specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include
log income, household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of
sick household members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality,
role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as
a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number
of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are
not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village
level are reported in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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Table 1.10: Robustness checks
Panel A: Additional controls - external links and enumerator effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome variable: Road Commu. Water well Public Public Total
construc. buildings construc. health educ. contrib.
Obs: 2,110
Degree cent. 0.012 0.021 0.029* 0.010 0.012 0.064**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.027)
Eigenvector cent. 0.054 0.096 0.133* 0.044 0.054 0.292**
(0.061) (0.057) (0.074) (0.044) (0.045) (0.110)
Mean of outcome 0.61 0.71 0.5 0.67 0.44 3.1
Panel B: Full sample
Obs: 2,718
Degree cent. 0.006 0.019* 0.031*** 0.006 0.021** 0.058**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.024)
Eigenvector cent. 0.025 0.083* 0.135*** 0.026 0.092** 0.253**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.037) (0.042) (0.100)
Mean of outcome 0.62 0.71 0.51 0.67 0.44 3.11
Panel C: Full sample excluding households with ethnic fraction >0.98 or <0.02
Obs: 2,339
Degree cent. 0.006 0.021** 0.031*** 0.004 0.022** 0.056**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.026)
Eigenvector cent. 0.026 0.091** 0.136*** 0.017 0.094** 0.244**
(0.048) (0.044) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042) (0.107)
Mean of outcome 0.58 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.48 3.16
Notes: This table shows the 3 robustness checks as described in Section 5. Panel A reestimates the
IV regressions controlling for an extensive set of external network variables and enumerator FE.
Panel B expand the sample to the full sample as described in Section 4. Panel C restrict the sample
to exclude households at the extreme tails of the ethnic fraction distribution. Each cell presents the
main coefficient of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE,
village FE, and the following characteristics: log income, household size, age of household head,
whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of
land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role
as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status,
relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts.
The coefficients of other variables are not reported here, but are available upon request. Robust
standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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Table 1.11: OLS regressions with squared terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Variable Road Community Water well Public Public Total
construc. building construc. health educ. contrib.
Panel A: Degree centrality
Degree cent. -0.002 0.012 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.024)
Degree cent. squared 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel B: Eigenvector centrality
Eigenvector cent. -0.074 0.070 0.205 -0.054 0.198** 0.086
(0.096) (0.070) (0.125) (0.095) (0.092) (0.243)
Eigen. cent. squared 0.195 0.029 0.386 -0.047 -0.120 0.009
(0.285) (0.217) (0.364) (0.283) (0.199) (0.717)
Mean of outcome 0.58 0.70 0.48 0.66 0.48 3.11
Number of obs. 2,100
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates similar to those in Panel B of Table 1.8 but with a
squared term of network centrality. This purpose of this estimation is to investigate the possibility of
non-linear relationship between public good contribution and network centrality. Each cell presents
the main coefficients of interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-
group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size,
age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members,
number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief,
role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a
marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts
and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here,
but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported
in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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Table 1.12: Nonlinear relationships between network degree centrality and public
good contributions for combined networks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Variable Road Community Water well Public Public Total
construc. building construc. health educ. contrib.
Degree: 1-2 -0.036 0.036 0.062 0.039 0.036 0.115
(0.042) (0.035) (0.043) (0.028) (0.031) (0.082)
Degree: 3-4 -0.022 0.051 0.060 0.037 -0.010 0.094
(0.038) (0.039) (0.051) (0.031) (0.040) (0.096)
Degree: 5-6 -0.029 0.055 0.093* 0.032 0.061 0.151
(0.042) (0.041) (0.047) (0.035) (0.041) (0.111)
Degree: 7+ -0.027 0.040 0.126** 0.023 0.074* 0.133
(0.041) (0.045) (0.057) (0.038) (0.043) (0.115)
R-squared 0.410 0.425 0.350 0.418 0.400 0.507
Observations 2,110
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates similar to those in Panel B of Table 1.8. Instead of
degree centrality, I use categorical variables for different levels of degree centrality to investigate
the possibility of non-linear relationship between public good contribution and network centrality.
Each cell presents the main coefficients of interest for each separate regression. All specifications
include ethnic-group FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income,
household size, age of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household
members, number of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village
chief, role as a traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a
marabout, religion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts
and number of grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here,
but are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported
in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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Table 1.13: Peer effects specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Variable Road Commu. Water well Public Public Total
construc. building construc. health educ. contrib.
# Links who contribute 0.010* 0.005* 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
# Links (Degree cent.) -0.008 -0.000 -0.003 0.007 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Number of Obs. 2,100
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates from a peer-effects specification which regresses house-
hold contribution on its peers’ average contribution. Each cell presents the main coefficient of
interest for each separate regression. All specifications include ethnic-group FE and village FE.
The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age of household head,
whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number of workers, size of
land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a traditional healer, role
as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, religion, marital status,
relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of grass-roof huts.
The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available upon request.
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Network Terminology
This appendix describes formal definitions of network terminology. For definitions of other network
terminology, see Jackson (2007).
A graph pN,Gq consists of a set of nodes (in this setting, households), N “ t1, ...nu, and a
nˆn binary matrix, G, where gij represents the relation between i and j. gij is equal to 1, if i and
j are connected and is equal to 0 otherwise.
• Degree centrality
Degree centrality refers to the number of nodes connected to a given node i in a graph.
dipGq “ #tj : gij “ 1u “ ř
j
gij .
• Bonacich centrality (Bonacich (1987))
Let cipα, βq denote the Bonacich centrality of a network, G. The β parameter reflects the
degree to which a node’s centrality score is a function of the scores of those to whom it is
connected.
cipα, βq “ ř
j
pα` βcjqgij
In matrix notation,
cpα, βq “ αpI ´ βGq´1G1
where “1” is a column vector of ones and I is an identity matrix. For the matrix in the
parentheses to be invertible, it must be that β P p´ 1λg , 1λg q, where λg is the largest eigenvalue
of G. The α parameter only affects the length of cpα, βq. It is a normalizing factor generally
selected so that the Euclidean norm of the vector equals the number of nodes in the network:ř
i
cipα, βq2 “ n.
• Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich (1972))
Let ei denote the eigenvector centrality associated with a network, G. The centrality of a
node is proportional to the sum of the centrality of its connected nodes:
λei “ gi1e1 ` gi2e2 ` . . .` ginen “ řj gijej .
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In matrix notion: λe “ Ge, where λ is a proportionality factor. e is an eigenvector of G and
λ is its corresponding eigenvalue (the largest eigenvalue, λg, to ensure positive entries in e).
Another way to interpret the eigenvector centrality is to view it as the limiting case of the
Bonacich centrality where the β-parameter approaches the inverse of the largest eigenvalue
of G (see a discussion in Bonacich (2007)). The eigenvector centrality of a node is then a
weighted sum of walks that that node has starting from it. A walk of length 1 is assigned a
value 1{λ1g where λ1g Ñ λg. A walk of length 2 is p1{λ1gq2 and so on.
• Network density
Network density measures how connected a network is relative to all possible links. n is the
number of nodes in N .
density “ #all linkspn2q .
• Undirected and unweighted links
An undirected link refers to a link in which if i is linked to j, then j is linked to i. An
unweighted link refers to a relationship that does not have any intensity level associated
with. The value of links as represented in an adjacency matrix is either 0 or 1.
1.9.2 Economic-exchange networks
In addition to kin networks, the survey also contains information on economic in-
teractions of households within the village. Two given households are considered
to have an economic-exchange link if they had transacted on land, labor, credit, or
production inputs such as tools and fertilizer within one year prior to the survey. I
refer to a network of this relationship as an economic-exchange network.35
For economic-exchange networks, the IV, household ethnic fraction, is not strong
enough to predict household centrality. Even though there is a positive relationship
between having economic transactions and belonging to the same ethnic group, such
correlation does not translate to enough predictive power, especially when condition-
ing on having a kin link (Arcand and Jaimovich (2012)). This weak correlation, on
the other hand, also emphasizes the fact that ethnic identity is not very salient in the
35 I combine all types of economic transactions, following Jaimovich (2011).
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Gambia setting. Ethnicity does not influence with whom households choose to engage
in economic activities. Nonetheless, the descriptive results can help understanding
the bigger picture of how different types of network relationships influence public
good decisions in comparisons to the main results. I use the same OLS specification
analogous to that in Table 1.8:
Contribute ijk “ γ0 ` γ1Centralityijk ` γ2Xijk ` ETHj ` vk ` ijk (1.1)
Next, I combine both kin networks and economic-exchange networks. In this case,
the same IV passes the weak instrument test. This stronger relationship is mainly
driven by kin networks; therefore, the results must be interpreted as a supplement
to the kin network results. Table 1.14 reports the economic-exchange network and
combined network results. The signs of the centrality coefficients align wtih the
results for kin networks.
However, only community building contribution has the strongest positive corre-
lation with centrality. The IV results for combined networks show the same signs and
significance patterns as the kin network results. This is expected mainly because kin
networks comprise a larger portion of combined networks than economic exchange
networks. To conclude, it seems that kin networks rather than economic exchange
networks is the key factor influencing household decisions to contribute to public
goods.
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1.9.3 Additional Tables
Table 1.15: Reduced-form results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Vars Road Commu. Water well Public Public Total
construction buildings construction health education contribution
Ethnic fraction 0.020 0.080 0.123* 0.026 0.034 0.187*
(0.056) (0.051) (0.063) (0.038) (0.049) (0.097)
Number of obs 2,083
Notes: This table shows the reduced-form estimates from regressing public good contribution
directly on the IV, household ethnic group size. Each column presents the coefficient of household
ethnic fraction for each type of public good contribution. All specifications include ethnic-group
FE and village FE. The set of household characteristics include log income, household size, age
of household head, whether head is female, illiteracy, number of sick household members, number
of workers, size of land owned, whether land is of high quality, role as the village chief, role as a
traditional healer, role as a village development committee, role as a imam, role as a marabout, reli-
gion, marital status, relative wealth, agricultural income, number of corrugated huts and number of
grass-roof huts. The coefficients of household characteristics are not reported here, but are available
upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses.
*** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1
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2(Limited) Diffusion of Health-protecting Behaviors:
Evidence from Non-beneficiaries of a Public Health
Program in Orissa (India)
with Aprajit Mahajan and Alessandro Tarozzi
2.1 Introduction
Transmittable diseases such as malaria, yellow fever or intestinal worms, remain a
heavy burden for public health in developing countries. In many cases, technological
advances have created efficacious preventative measures. For instance, de-worming
drugs are very effective at eliminating intestinal infections (Miguel and Kremer 2004)
and insecticide treated nets can reduce considerably the burden of malaria (Lengeler
2004). The cost of such preventive technologies are very low for rich countries stan-
dards, but can be prohibitively expensive in low-income countries where neither
individuals nor public health programs may have sufficient funding. A growing lit-
erature therefore studies the reasons of and possible solutions to the low uptake of
health-protecting technologies in poor countries, see Holla and Kremer (2009) and
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Dupas (2012) for recent reviews.
Given the low rates of adoption typically observed among the poor, the lack of
experience with such potentially useful technology is often a factor that—together
with budget constraints—further reduces demand. Several researchers have thus
examined if social networks can facilitate the diffusion of health-protecting products.
More generally, public health interventions that introduce such products on a large
scale can generate important externalities through changes in disease environment,
see Hawley et al. (2003) for the case of insecticide treated nets and malaria, or Miguel
and Kremer (2004) for deworming drugs.
However, identifying network effects is hard. The main econometric problem lies
in the endogeneity of social networks, as well-documented by a rich literature (see
Manski 1993b, Brock and Durlauf 2001, Bramoulle´ et al. 2009 among others). To
address this empirical problem, economists have used different strategies depending
on the nature of the data. Some of the previous studies have used non-experimental
data to tease out the network effects on the adoption of new agricultural technolo-
gies by making various identifying assumptions (Besley and Case 1994, Foster and
Rosenzweig 1995, Munshi and Myaux 2006). Another key element in the estimation
of network effects involves defining which social group constitutes the network. Some
works use geographical or cultural proximity (Bertrand et al. 2000, Angelucci and
Giorgi 2009, Dupas 2010). Others have argued that self-reported networks of friends
and family are a better representation of social links (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 2006,
Conley and Udry 2010).
In this paper, we study the links between social networks and adoption of health-
protecting technologies using data from a randomized controlled trial conducted in
highly malarious areas of rural Orissa, India, between 2007 and 2009. The project
was carried out in collaboration with the micro-lender Bharat Integrated Social Wel-
fare Agency (BISWA) in 141 villages where BISWA lending activity was operational.
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The main purpose of the field experiment was to evaluate the impact, relative to con-
trol conditions, on the take-up, usage and health effects of insecticide-treated bednets
(ITNs) distributed either through micro-consumer loans or free of cost. Numerous
studies have shown that high coverage and use rates of ITNs can significantly re-
duce malaria-related morbidity and mortality, see Lengeler (2004) for an extensive
review of the evidence. Considerable evidence in particular shows that ITNs can be
significantly more effective than bednets not treated with insecticide, because only
the former nets can lead to externalities which benefit even individuals not sleeping
under an ITN due to the reduction in mosquito density (Hawley et al. 2003, Killeen
et al. 2007).
The results of the ITN distribution program on BISWA households’ outcomes
are described in detail in Tarozzi et al. (2011). The authors show that despite a
substantial increase in ITN ownership and (self-reported) usage, especially in areas
with free distribution, malaria indices did not improve during the study period. A
key feature of the study was that the beneficiaries of the distribution programs were
only ‘BISWA households’, that is, households where at least one individual was
already affiliated to BISWA. On average, about 20% of the population in the 141
study villages had such affiliation, so that the majority of the local population was
not directly affected by the program. Tarozzi et al. (2011) conjecture that the low
coverage of the ITN distribution program was a leading cause for the lack of observed
health benefits. If externalities that derive from high usage rates are key factors for
the effectiveness of a health product, then public health programs that do not lead
to such high coverage rates may lead to a waste of resources. Such concerns may be
mitigated if within-community usage diffuses from beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries
of distribution programs through network effects.
In this paper we analyze how the increased rates of ITN ownership and us-
age observed among BISWA households affected the same outcomes among non-
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beneficiaries, using data collected during the post-intervention survey, carried out in
the winter of 2008-09. A key feature of our data is the availability of information on
the number and type of social links between non-beneficiaries and a sample of BISWA
households directly affected by the program. We then examine three specific ques-
tions. First, we estimate simple differences in outcomes between non-beneficiaries in
control areas versus others residing in program areas where ITN ownership rates of
BISWA households were exogenously increased by the program. Second, we exam-
ine if such differences where affected by the number and type of social ties between
non-beneficiary and BISWA households. Although such ties are clearly endogenous,
finding that the interaction between the ties and an (exogenous) program dummy
matters for non-beneficiaries’ outcomes would signal that spillover effects are present
and likely mediated by the social links. Third, we estimate the effect of BISWA
peers’ behavior on the behavior of non-beneficiaries with instrumental variables, us-
ing program dummies as plausibly exogenous instruments for the (endogenous) peers’
behavior.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that uses experimental variation to
estimate peer effects in the adoption of health-protecting technologies in developing
countries. In a seminal paper, Kremer and Miguel (2007) showed that take-up of
deworming drugs among schoolchildren in Kenya was lower among children with a
larger fraction of peers exposed to a public health program of free treatment. They
rationalize the result on the basis of the small private benefit and large positive
externalities of the drug. In contrast, Dupas (2010) finds that experimental variation
in the fraction of neighbors who received free or highly subsidized ITNs (a product
with potentially high private returns) increases the likelihood of purchase. Kremer
et al. (2011) find that random variation in the fraction of peers exposed to a point-
of-use chlorine treatment for drinking water in Kenya had little impact on take-up.
However, using an approach based on Graham (2008), they also find strong peer
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effects in the adoption of a point-of-collection water purification method based on
a chlorine dispenser system. They explain the different results based on the public
(point-of-collection) versus private (point-of-use) nature of the action required to
adopt the two technologies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the experi-
mental setup and descriptive statistics. We discuss the results on the spillover effects
of the free ITN distribution on non-beneficiaries in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, while in
Section 2.3.3 we estimate peer effects of ITN adoption and usage using instrumental
variables. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Data and Study Design
The results described in this paper are part of a broader evaluation of the cost ef-
fectiveness and health impacts of alternative mechanisms to deliver ITNs in poor
areas of rural Orissa, India. Official figures pinpoint Orissa as the most highly
malaria endemic state in the country (Kumar et al. 2007). The key element of the
broader project was a large-scale cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) designed
to evaluate the uptake and impacts of insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs) through
micro-consumer loans, as compared to free distribution and control conditions. The
study was conducted in rural Orissa in 2007-09, in collaboration with Bharat Inte-
grated Social Welfare Agency (BISWA), a micro-lender with an important presence
in the study areas.
A baseline survey was completed in May-June 2007 with a sample of 1,844 house-
holds from 141 villages with BISWA presence. In all sampled households, at least one
member was affiliated to BISWA, having joined a BISWA ‘self-help group’. These are
self-formed groups that can apply for micro-loans for which each member becomes
jointly liable. We will refer to this sample of 1,844 households affiliated to BISWA
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as ‘baseline’ or ‘BISWA’ households.
After the baseline, villages were randomly assigned to one of three different ex-
perimental arms. In the fall of 2007, the project team carried out in all villages an
information session about malaria and proper use of bed nets. In addition, in a first
group of 47 villages (“Free” experimental arm), the team distributed free ITNs to all
households with members affiliated to BISWA, along with the promise of two free
insecticide retreatments at six month intervals. A second group of 47 villages (“MF”)
received offers to buy ITNs on credit, through micro-loans with a repayment term of
one year at a 20% interest rate. The ITN offer price was not negligible, correspond-
ing approximately to three to five times the local daily agricultural wage. Lastly, the
control group received no other intervention beyond the information session.
About 96% of the households approached at baseline were then re-interviewed
between December 2008 and May 2009, forming a panel of 1,768 households. In
earlier work, Tarozzi et al. (2011) show that 52% of sample households purchased
ITNs on credit in MF villages, although coverage in these locations remained sig-
nificantly lower than what achieved with free distribution, where 96% of households
received at least one ITN. Unexpectedly, neither micro-loans nor free distribution
led to improvements in malaria and anemia prevalence.
A key element of the RCT was the focus on households with BISWA affiliation.
Only these households were included in the delivery program, and all surveyed house-
holds were selected from lists of BISWA affiliates. In this paper, we focus instead
on a supplementary sample added at the time of the post-intervention survey, in
2008-09. This additional sample was added for the purpose of studying impacts on
non-beneficiaries.1 The sampling frame was represented by publicly available census
lists drafted as part of the Below the Poverty Line (BPL) census carried out in 2002
1 Non-beneficiaries were only included in the post-intervention survey because the necessary fund-
ing was not available beforehand.
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by the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of Orissa, with the purpose of
identifying ‘poor’ households eligible to benefit from a number of welfare programs.
Although our survey was carried out a few years after the census, preliminary ob-
servations in the field showed that the rosters remained overall reliable. In each
study village, 10 new households were thus randomly chosen from the census lists,
regardless of their BISWA membership. Interviews were then completed with a total
of 1,425 new households, of which 1,153 were not affiliated with BISWA. In this
paper, we analyze the behavior of these 1,153 non-BISWA households as a function
of their indirect exposure to the ITN distribution program. In contrast, we do not
use information about households with BISWA affiliation, because these would have
likely been affected directly by the interventions.
In principle, the categorization of households as ‘BISWA’ or ‘non-BISWA’ could
be problematic if affiliation with the micro-lender was endogenously affected by our
ITN distribution programs. For instance, suppose that after the ITN distribution
programs non-members with higher expected benefits from ITNs were more likely to
join a BISWA self-help group, in the expectation of future ITN distribution programs.
Then we would have likely observed a higher fraction of BISWA members among
the new census-drawn households in Free or MF villages relative to control areas.
However, the fraction of BISWA members in the population is similar in the three
experimental arms (22.5, 20.5 and 20% in Control, Free and MF villages respectively)
and the null of equality cannot be rejected at standard levels (p-value“ .806). In the
rest of the paper, we will thus assume that BISWA membership was exogenous.
2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
The post-intervention survey was conducted using a uniform questionnaire for all
interviewees, regardless of whether they were part of the panel or their BISWA
affiliation. Enumerators recorded demographic, socio-economic, health and other in-
63
dicators as well as detailed information on sleeping patterns, bednet ownership and
use. In a key section of the questionnaire, we collected information about social ties
between the respondent’s household and each of the BISWA households interviewed
in the same village before the intervention (‘baseline households’). First, the respon-
dent was asked if anyone in his/her household knew any member from each of the
baseline households. Second, if the answer was yes, we recorded the frequency of
the social contacts (daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly). Third, we asked how
often the social contacts involved conversations about health-related issues. Fourth,
we asked “[w]hen you think about ways of protecting yourself and your family from
malaria, do you take into consideration what persons in [panel household] do and
what their opinions are?”.
We use this information to construct three alternative measures of social links
between non-BISWA households in the supplemental sample and baseline households
from the same village. The first and most basic measure is the fraction of baseline
households known to the respondent (‘BISWA Network’). Next, we calculate the
fraction of baseline households with whom the respondent’s households interacted at
least once a week (‘Close BISWA Network’) and finally the fraction whose opinions
about ways of protecting oneself from malaria were taken into account (‘Influential
BISWA Network’). Previous empirical works on social networks have used a similar
concepts, by directly asking about common conversation topics to identify sources
of information (Kremer et al. 2011, Conley and Udry 2010).
We chose to use fractions instead of numbers because the number of baseline
households are not always the same across villages. Suppose that a respondent re-
ports links to, say, 10 baseline households. In a village where 15 baseline household
were interviewed this would indicate links with an estimated 2/3 of BISWA house-
holds, while in a village where only 10 were interviewed we would estimate that a
link exists with all BISWA household in the village, thereby indicating a stronger
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potential indirect exposure to the program. Recall that all households in the base-
line survey were randomly chosen from a list of BISWA members within the village,
whereas the new households were randomized from census list of that village. There-
fore, the network measures as described above are unbiased estimators of the true
fractions we would have observed if we had information about links to all BISWA
households in the village.2
In Figure 2.1 we show the histogram of BISWA Network. The average network
size of the entire sample was 0.64 so that, on average, non-BISWA households knew
about two-thirds of BISWA households from the same village. The majority of
households (68%) knew more than half of the BISWA links within their villages,
with 260 households (23%) knowing everyone (BISWA Network “ 1). Very few
households had no or very few links with the baseline sample. In Figure 2.2 we show
the histogram of Close BISWA Network. A comparison with Figure 2.1 shows that
frequent interactions were not the rule, and on average close links only existed with
less than half (44%) of baseline households. In total, 691 respondents (60%) reported
frequent interactions with only half or less of the baseline BISWA households. Finally,
Figure 2.3 shows the histogram of Influential BISWA Network. This looks overall
similar to the histogram from close links, although there is more mass both on the
bottom and the top of the distribution.
To further investigate the pattern of social networks in the sample, we explore the
association between the network measures and a number of household characteristics.
We estimate simple OLS regressions using the measures of social ties with BISWA
households as dependent variable. All estimates also include village fixed effects,
2 Note, however, that a corollary of this way of estimating links to BISWA households is that each
BISWA Network variable is measured with error, and the error will be correlated with the fraction
of households affiliated to BISWA in each village. For instance, in a village with only 10 BISWA
households, all of them would have been interviewed, and BISWA Network would be estimated with
no error. But in a village with 50 BISWA households, only 15 of them would have been included
in the baseline sample, thereby increasing the measurement error of the BISWA Network variable.
We have ignored these considerations so far, although they likely deserve further scrutiny.
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because the network variable may partly reflect the fact that some villages are smaller
in size and therefore have a closer-knit community. The results, in Table 2.1, show
that the network measures are overall very weakly correlated with almost all of
the socio-economic and demographic indicators included as regressors. The clear
exception is the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe (SCST) dummy, whose coefficient is
systematically significant at the 5% or lower level, and relatively large in magnitude.
Households that belong to SCST are on average linked to 5-6 percentage points more
BISWA households than non-SCST ones. This is perhaps not surprising, given that
a large fraction of BISWA affiliates belong to SCST social groups.
Tarozzi et al. (2011) showed that the characteristics of BISWA households were
overall balanced across arms. Here we look at cross-arm balance in selected summary
statistics for the supplementary sample of non-BISWA households see. Because we do
not have baseline data for these households, all statistics are derived from the post-
intervention survey. We focus on household characteristics unlikely to have changed
with the interventions. The results in Table 2.2 show that sample households are on
average large and poor. Only 40% of sample households have access to electricity,
and the average monthly expenditure per head is 692 Rupees, about 50 USD using
the most recent parity purchasing power exchange rate (World Bank (2008)). When
we carry out tests of equality of means across experimental arms, the null is never
rejected at standard levels. This is also true for each of the three Network variables,
although links to BISWA households appear to be slightly more infrequent in Free
and above all MF communities. In panel B, we also look at village-level character-
istics, using data from the 2001 Census of India. Villages in Free groups are larger
that in the other two arms in terms of area and populations, but the differences are
not statistically significant.
As documented in Tarozzi et al. (2011), bednets were already available in the
study areas prior to the intervention, but treatment with insecticide was rare. About
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two-thirds of baseline BISWA households owned at least one bed net, but less than
10% owned at least one treated net. Almost all of these bed nets were purchased from
the market, at a median price of 70 Rupees, about 1.5 times the typical daily wage
for agricultural labor in the area. Free distribution of bednets from Government or
NGO-driven public health program was very rare, outside of our intervention. This
was consistent with our sampling frame which, to avoid contamination, excluded
areas where such distribution programs had been or were expected to be conducted
in the foreseeable future. Tarozzi et al. (2011) show that no such contamination
appeared to have taken place during the duration of the evaluation.
2.2.2 Outcomes
Throughout the paper we focus on different indicators of bednet adoption, using
data on ownership, purchases and usage. We look separately at ITNs and ‘any net’,
where the latter includes all bednets regardless of treatment status. Information on
bednets purchases and ownership was collected as follows. First, the respondent was
asked to list all ‘sleeping spaces’ (indoors or outdoors) used by members during the
previous night. We then recorded who slept in each space, and whether the space
was protected by a bednet. If the answer to the latter question was yes, we recorded
when the bednet was acquired, from which source and at which price, and whether
and when the bednet had been treated with insecticide. We count a bednet as an
ITN if it had been treated with insecticide up to six months before the interview.
Standard bednets need to be periodically re-treated with chemicals in order to retain
their insecticidal power. The frequency of the re-treatment depends on the type and
concentration of the chemical used, but we choose six month because such was the
appropriate time interval given the specifics of the insecticide used with the project
nets (see Tarozzi et al. 2011 for details).3
3 Unlike the standard bednets used in our project, Long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLIN) do not
require period re-treatment with chemical. Such nets are becoming more common in public health
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The focus on last-night usage reduces the possibility of recall error, although it
is admittedly a noisy measure of regular usage.4 Next, we asked if the household
owned any other bednet besides those used the previous night, and if so we collected
the same information detailed above about each additional bednet.5 We categorize
a bednet (or ITN) as ‘recently acquired’ (from any source) if it had been with the
household for less than 18 months. Such nets were thus likely acquired after our
interventions.
2.3 Results
We organize the results in three parts. First, we examine simple differences in mean
outcomes between experimental arms. Second, we estimate the association between
outcomes and the alternative measures of links to BISWA households across arms,
indicating the likely presence of spillovers from BISWA to non-beneficiary households.
Finally, we re-visit the standard problem of peer effects using instrumental variable
estimation, making use of the exogenous variation in peers’ outcomes that derive
from the experimental setting.
2.3.1 Differences in Means
We first look at the simple cross-arm differences in outcomes. Recall that we are
examining the behavior of non-BISWA households, none of whom was targeted by
programs, and their use is recommended by the World Health Organization. However, they remain
rarely available in local markets in developing countries.
4 Information on bednet usage was also independently collected in the household roster. For each
member, we recorded whether the member had slept under a bednet the night before the interview,
and whether the net had been treated in the previous six months. Data on usage from the two
alternative sources are very highly correlated and so the results are substantively the same using
either source. The similarity of the results is also reassuring because it reduces the likely extent of
reporting error.
5 Survey enumerators also asked permission to see the bednets. This allowed them to verify the
presence of the bednets, their state of maintenance, and whether the net was from our distribution
program (BISWA nets were clearly labeled and easily identified).
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our distribution programs. Recall also that observed characteristics unlikely to be
influenced by the interventions appeared to be balanced across the different arms,
and that we maintain the assumption that BISWA affiliation was not affected by
our intervention. Under these conditions, in the absence of any kind of spillovers to
non-beneficiaries we should observe similar bednet ownership and usage rates in Free
and MF villages relative to Control areas. On the other hand, there are at least four
channels through which the interventions could have impacted bednet ownership and
usage among non-beneficiary households. First, non-BISWA households may have
been exposed directly to the short information session on malaria and bednet that
took place in the fall of 2007. Second, behavior may have been affected later on
through imitation or learning, mechanisms that we will explore in more details in
Section 2.3.2. Third, some ITNs may have been transferred from BISWA households
to non-beneficiaries as gifts or through sales. Fourth, the frequency of bednet usage
may have affected by community-wide changes in the local mosquito population and
malaria prevalence caused by our programs of ITN distribution, especially in areas
where a large number of ITNs were delivered for free to all BISWA affiliates.
The results, in Table 2.3, show that for all but two outcomes the null of equal
means cannot be rejected at standard levels. About one every three households ac-
quired at least one bednet during the previous 18 months, while only one in ten
acquired nets that had been recently treated with insecticide. The fraction of indi-
viduals who slept under a bednets or an ITN was slightly higher in treatment versus
control areas, but the null of equality is never rejected at standard levels. In partic-
ular, less than 10% of individuals slept under a treated net (3.9% in control areas,
4.3% in Free and 4.7% in MF villages). The null of equality is rejected at the 10%
(but not at the 5%) level only for the outcomes that measure recently acquired ITNs.
While 9% of non-BISWA households acquired any ITNs in the last year and a half
in control areas and 7% did in Free areas, the fraction was much higher at 14.2%
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in MF villages.6 Transfers of BISWA nets from baseline households to non-BISWA
households via reselling or donations are unlikely to be the cause of such differences,
because most of the recently acquired ITNs were reported to be purchased from the
market. In fact, only seven households owned BISWA nets.
In the last two rows of Table 2.3 we also examine difference in malaria prevalence
and hemoglobin levels (another key health indicator often associated to malaria).
Both indices were measured through blood tests conducted with rapid diagnostic
tests that delivered results within minutes, directly in the field (see Tarozzi et al.
2011 for details). All individuals of age below 10 or between 18 and 40 were targeted
for testing.7 Overall, 2,345 individuals of age from 876 households were tested for
malaria, while hemoglobin was measured for 2,362 individuals from 881 households.
The results show that both health indicators were very similar across treatment
groups, and the null of equality is not rejected at standard levels. Malaria prevalence
was very high, with about 20% of individuals testing positive. Hemoglobin level was
11.5 grams per deciliter (g/dl) of blood on average. This is low, given that 11 g/dl is
sometimes taken as a threshold below which individuals are consider anemic (Thomas
et al. 2006).
The remarkable similarity of malaria indices across arms is a strong indicator that
the local epidemiological environment was not affected by the interventions. This is
consistent with earlier studies that suggest that community protective effects of ITNs
only emerge when 60% or more of sleeping spaces are covered. Tarozzi et al. (2011)
show that such high coverage rates were never achieved by our interventions, which
only targeted BISWA households. Indeed, the authors suggest that this may have
6 The difference remains large and significant even after dropping two MF villages where BISWA
households in the sample purchased an unusually large number of ITNs for resale.
7 Thirty-two percent of individuals were not tested, with the proportion seven percentage points
higher in Free communities, and two percentage points higher in MF villages. The joint null of
equal testing rate is not rejected at standard levels (p-value“ 0.1113), although the null of equality
between Free and Control areas is rejected (p-value“ 0.042).
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been a key factor in explaining the lack of impacts of the ITN distribution programs
on health indices observed even among the beneficiary households.
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Impacts as a Function of Links to Beneficiaries
We have shown that mean outcomes in Control villages appear to be very close to
those observed in Free villages. In this section, we explore whether such aggregate
results actually mask the existence of spillovers for non-beneficiary households with
tighter links to BISWA members. Among BISWA members, Tarozzi et al. (2011)
show that increases in ITN ownership and usage in Free and MF versus Control
communities were substantively and statistically significant. At the time of the post-
intervention survey (when data on the supplemental sample were collected as well),
BISWA households owned on average 1.9 bednets in Control areas, 2.5 in MF villages
and 3.4 with Free distribution. The random assignment of villages into experimental
arms generated thus exogenous variation among non-BISWA households in their
exposure to information about bed nets and insecticide treatment, through their
links with BISWA households.
For a given outcome Yvi for household i from village v, we estimate models such
as the following:
Yvi “ αNetworkvi ` βNetworkvi ˆ Freev ` γ1Xvi ` Fv ` vi, (2.1)
where Networkvi is one of the measures of links to a ‘BISWA Network’ described in
Section 2.2.2, Freev denotes the treatment status, Fv is a village fixed effect, and Xi
is a vector of household characteristics unlikely to have changed as a consequence of
the intervention. Such control variables include household size, number of children
under 5 years old, fraction of males in the household, number of household members
who completed some schooling, number of rooms in the dwelling, access to electricity,
and whether the household belongs to scheduled tribe/caste. We estimate all models
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using Ordinary Least Squares.8 We calculate standard errors allowing for intra-
village correlation of residuals.
Note that in estimating model (2.3.2) we only include observations from Control
and Free villages. In the latter communities, virtually all sample BISWA house-
holds received ITNs during our intervention. The number of nets received was a
function of the demographic composition of the households (with a ceiling of four
ITNs per household) and was therefore exogenously determined by our field team. In
contrast, demand for ITNs in MF villages was endogenously determined by BISWA
members. In these latter communities, non-BISWA households with stronger links
to program beneficiaries were then not necessarily ‘exposed’ to more nets, and this
would complicate the interpretation of the results.
In the absence of any spillover to non-beneficiary households, we would expect βˆ
to be close to zero. This coefficient can be interpreted as the differential impact of
the free ITN distribution on outcomes of non-BISWA households, as a function of
their links to the beneficiaries of the program. A key limitation of this approach is
that social links with BISWA households are clearly not exogenous. Individuals with
stronger or more numerous ties are likely to be systematically different from others
with smaller networks. Indeed, in Table 2.1 we have shown that some household char-
acteristics (in particular SCST status) predict the size of the ‘BISWA Network’. In
addition, being part of a large network may be correlated with unobserved character-
istics such as sociability and open-mindedness which, in turn, are likely to influence
the propensity to adopt a new technology. In principle, for instance, large estimates
of βˆ could be due not to peer effects, but to more connected households having been
more likely to be present during the bednet treatment with insecticide that often
took place in public areas. In such case, any impact on bednet usage or treatment
8 The linear probability models yield similar results compared to probit and logit models. These
are available upon request.
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rates would have been due to direct exposure to the implementation of the program
rather than to any social dynamic.
While keeping these caveats in mind, we first estimate a specification where social
links are measured by ‘BISWA Network’, defined as the fraction of the baseline
BISWA households known to the non-beneficiary household i (see Section 2.2.1 for
details). We look at four different outcomes: a dummy for households that acquired
at least one ITN from any source in the 18 months before the interview; a similar
dummy defined for nets regardless of treatment status; the fraction of household
members that slept under an ITN the night before the interview, and the fraction
who slept protected by a bednet regardless of treatment. The results are in Table
2.4. All estimates of α, which measures the association between the network variable
and the outcome in control areas, are small and not significant at standard levels.
The estimate of β for recently acquired ITNs is close to zero and not significant,
while the estimate for all acquired bednets is relative large (0.183) but again not sig-
nificant at standard levels. In contrast, usage of both ITNs and any bednets appears
to be more common for households with more social ties with BISWA affiliates. The
estimates implies that, in non-beneficiary households in areas with Free distribution
of ITNs, knowing all BISWA members in the baseline sample as opposed to none
increases the fraction of individuals having slept under ITNs by 7 percentage points,
and the fraction who slept protected by a net regardless of treatment by 16 percent-
age points. Both coefficients are significant, although only at the 10% level. These
estimates are substantively large, given that the overall fraction of individuals who
used bednets (treated or not) was well below 10% (see table 2.3).
Next, we explore whether the type of the social interactions plays a role in how
networks affected bednet-related behavior. Because closer peers may be more influ-
ential in household decisions, the impacts of the intervention channeled through close
peers may be stronger. We do not find much support for this hypothesis. When we
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use the two alternative measures ‘Close BISWA Network’ and ‘Influential BISWA
Network’ described in Section 2.2.1, the results show weak evidence of network ef-
fects, see Table 2.5. The only outcome where β is significant (and only at the 10%
level) is the dummy for recently acquired bednets. A household acquainted with all
baseline BISWA households, and who is influenced by their viewpoints on malaria
matters, has a 21 percentage point higher probability of having recently acquired at
least one net relative to another household with no such social ties. More generally,
the estimated impacts on net acquisition and usage are small and not significant
for ITNs, while they are substantively large (but not significant, with the exception
indicated above) for all nets regardless of treatment status.
In sum, we find only weak evidence supporting the view that the large increase
in ITN ownership and usage observed among BISWA households who received nets
free of cost was transmitted to non-beneficiaries through social ties. One simple
explanation for this finding is that, given the absence of health benefits even among
beneficiaries, and even in the presence of strong social ties between the two groups
of households, non-beneficiaries simply did not have sufficient incentives to adopt a
technology that, after all, was not protecting health effectively among their peers.
2.3.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation of Peer Effects
The previous section described models that aimed at identifying the spillover effects
of the free ITN distribution on the behavior of non-beneficiaries, spillovers that may
have taken place through social networks. An alternative identification strategy also
allows to identify directly the impact of BISWA social contacts’ behavior on the
choices of non-beneficiaries. Formally, we are interested in estimating the slope β1
in the following simple model:
Yvi “ β0 ` β1Xg,vi ` vi, (2.2)
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where, like before, Yvi is a given outcome for household i in village v, and Xg,vi is
a measure of malaria-related behavior among i’s social links, where social links are
defined in one of the alternative ways described in Section 2.2.1. Given the likely en-
dogenous sorting of individuals into social groups, OLS estimates would likely lead to
positive and significant estimates for β1, but such estimates would not be consistent
for the true causal impact of Xg,vi on the behavior of non-beneficiaries. However,
the exogenous variation in the behavior of social links due to the randomized inter-
ventions provides a useful framework to estimate peer effects. Specifically, we can
use the randomly assignment treatment status as an instrument for the endogenous
behavior of peers.
We then use data from all three experimental arms and use the two treatment
dummies MFv and Freev as instruments for the endogenous variable Xg,vi. The
two dummies are defined as MFv “ 1 for individuals in villages where ITNs were
offered for sale on credit, and Freev “ 1 in villages where ITNs were delivered free
of cost. Given that Xg,vi will be an index of bednet ownership or usage, and given
that such outcomes were significantly affected by the interventions, the instruments
should be very strongly correlated with the endogenous variable. In contrast, instru-
ment exogeneity is more demanding, because it requires that the only link between
i’s behavior (measured by Yvi) and the treatment dummies passes through the be-
havior of the social links. A first reason why such assumption could fail is if the
large increase in the fraction of village population protected by ITNs led to a reduc-
tion in the village-wide malaria prevalence. However, the results in Table 2.3 show
barely any difference in malaria indices by experimental arms. The assumption could
also fail if peers effects also work (as they are likely to) through indirect links. In
other words, Xg,vi measures only behavior among BISWA households included in the
village-specific sample at baseline, but non-beneficiaries may have also been affected
by the behavior of BISWA households not included in the sample, or by the choices
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made by others with social ties to BISWA households.9 Although these caveats must
be kept in mind, the availability of two instruments at least allows us to test their
exogeneity by carrying out standard tests of overidentification.
The estimates are shown in Table 2.6. As expected, all OLS estimates are positive,
although they are only large and significant when Xg,vi is the average number of all
bednets per person owned by the BISWA social links. However, when we estimate
equation (2.3.3) using two-stage least squares βˆ1 is always become smaller (in some
cases even changing sign) and it is never significant at standard levels. As expected,
there is no weak instrument problem, and the first stage F test is larger than 30
in both models. The overidentification tests also provide overall support to the
hypothesis of instrument exogeneity, although the null is rejected at the 10% level
when the outcome is a dummy for recently acquired ITNs. Overall, the results
suggest that peer effects were not important elements for the diffusion of bednet
usage in the sample.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have described evidence of some limited diffusion of bednet acqui-
sition and usage from beneficiaries of an ITN distribution program in rural Orissa,
India, to households that did not receive bednets during the intervention. Identi-
fication of such network effects hinged on the change in ITN adoption among the
beneficiaries of a program of bednet distribution that was carried out in a randomly
selected subset of the 141 study villages.
On the one hand, we have shown that, on average, there were very limited
spillovers. On the other hand, we find that bednet usage was substantively and
9 Network effects due to social ties with beneficiaries from other villages are instead very un-
likely, because the study villages were spread over five different districts, so that most villages were
geographically far apart.
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significantly associated with some (but not all) measures of social links between non-
beneficiaries and beneficiaries. This provides some evidence of network effects in
the adoption of a health product that has potentially high protective power against
malaria risk. However, given the endogeneity of social links, we cannot exclude that
such associations were at least in part due to indirect effects of the programs me-
diated by channels different from, but correlated with, the number of social links
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
In interpreting the results, it is useful to recall that the study area was very
broad, covering 141 villages in five different districts. At the same time, the ITN
distribution program was only conducted in communities where the micro-lender
BISWA was operating at the time of the baseline survey. The external validity of
our results should therefore be evaluated with caution. With this caveat, our results
should be a useful contribution to a growing literature that evaluates the diffusion of
health-protecting products through social networks in developing countries. Gauging
the extent of such diffusion is particularly important in settings where public health
programs only cover a fraction of the population at risk, and when coverage rates
are a key element for the effectiveness of the program. This can be crucial, given
the important role of externalities in fighting several transmittable diseases such as
malaria or other insect-borne diseases, or intestinal worms.
In our context, the limited diffusion in the adoption of ITNs in a highly malarious
area of rural Orissa may have been due to the overall absence of health benefits
among the primary beneficiaries of the ITN distribution program. This may have
been due to the low fraction of beneficiaries in the population, coupled with perhaps
irregular usage of ITNs. These factors may have limited the effectiveness of ITNs,
which has been otherwise convincingly documented in controlled conditions in the
field. In contrast, a different RCT carried out in Kenya, Dupas (2010) found that the
demand for bednets increased when a randomly determined higher fraction of social
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links had adopted the product. Although the different study area likely justifies
results different from ours, Dupas (2010) describes how a large fraction of bednet
users perceived a reduction in malaria risk, as well as little discomfort in using the
nets supplied through the project. The absence of clear health benefits in our context
is a likely key reason for the limited diffusion of ITN usage in our study area. If so,
free or heavily subsidized ITNs extended to the whole population may have been the
only way to reduce the malaria burden through this potentially important health
product.
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2.5 Figures
Figure 2.1: Distribution of BISWA Network
Data from winter 2008-09 from a supplemental sample of 1,153 households not affili-
ated to BISWA. BISWA Network is calculated as the fraction of baseline households
from the same village known to the respondent’s household. The overall sample
mean is 0.64.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Close BISWA Network
Data from winter 2008-09 from a supplemental sample of 1,153 households not affil-
iated to BISWA. Close BISWA Network is defined as the fraction of baseline house-
holds from the same village with whom the respondent’s households interacts at least
once a week. The overall sample mean is 0.44.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Influential BISWA Network
Data from winter 2008-09 from a supplemental sample of 1,153 households not af-
filiated to BISWA. Influential BISWA Network is defined as the fraction of baseline
households from the same village whose opinions about ways of protecting oneself
from malaria are taken into account by the respondent’s household. The overall
sample mean is 0.46.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Determinants of BISWA Network Size
(1) (2) (3)
BISWA Close Influential
Network BISWA BISWA
Network Network
Log per capita expenditure 0.005 0.013 0.015
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Household size 0.003 -0.005 0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Fraction of male -0.031 -0.035 0.077
(0.047) (0.058) (0.052)
#Children under 5 -0.022 0.006 -0.025
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
#Members completed some schooling 0.007 0.010 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
#Rooms in the dwelling 0.010** 0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Access to electricity 0.016 0.004 0.022
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Scheduled tribe/caste 0.048** 0.060*** 0.055**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027)
Constant 0.520*** 0.303*** 0.207**
(0.095) (0.110) (0.103)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,150 1,150 1,150
R-squared 0.020 0.005 0.014
Data from winter 2008-09 from a supplemental sample of 1,153 households non affiliated to BISWA.
Robust standard errors clustered at village level are reported in parentheses. BISWA Network is
calculated as the fraction of baseline households from the same village known to the respondent’s
households. Close BISWA Network is defined as the fraction of baseline households with whom the
respondent’s households interacts at least once a week. Influential BISWA Network is defined as
the fraction of baseline households from the same village whose opinions about ways of protecting
oneself from malaria are taken into account by the respondent’s household.
*** pă 0.01, ** p ă 0.05, * p ă 0.1.
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